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ABSTRACT 
 This thesis seeks to address how to overcome the economic divide that separates 
North and South Korea should reunification transpire. The focus of this thesis will be 
centered on two aspects of the North Korean economy lagging behind South Korea. The 
first is the gap of development in industry, agriculture, national infrastructure, and 
education. The second area of focus will be the economic and governance costs that 
international sanctions have imposed on North Korea. International sanctions have been 
shown to cause the following: increased disputes; erosion of governance capacity; 
empowering of anti-reform leaders and factions; disempowering of civil society; 
increased likelihood of violence; potential humanitarian effects; and detrimental 
economic impacts on the country, region, and its allies. 
 Findings show that North Korean economic policy decisions are largely 
responsible for the DPRK’s economic plight. Since the division between North and South 
Korea, DPRK leadership has consistently enacted economic policy decisions that can be 
characterized as short-sighted. These policy decisions often ignore, or are unaware of, the 
long-term consequences that they will create. While short-sighted, they are consistent in 
an attempt to maintain self-sufficiency despite a growing sense of insecurity. Decisions to 
maintain a strong military industrial complex and pursue nuclear weapons have resulted 
in international and economic isolation. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
A. MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTION AND FINDINGS 
For many Koreans, unification of the North and South remains highly desirable. 
This was recently evidenced during the 2018 Winter Olympics with the North and South 
Koreans marching together under the Korean Unification Flag.1  The desire for 
unification in-part stems from a shared history, culture, language, familial ties, and 
oppression. However, unification of the Korean Peninsula requires that several major 
obstacles be overcome to ensure an orderly transition under unified rule. One central 
obstacle that must be overcome for peaceful unification to occur is the ever-growing 
economic divide between North and South Korea. While the international community has 
voiced their support of a peaceful unification scenario between the North and South, the 
economic burden would largely fall upon South Korea. Failure to bridge the economic 
divide could trigger famine, mass emigration, or violence to occur. 
This thesis seeks to address how to overcome the economic divide that separates 
North and South Korea should reunification transpire. The focus of this thesis will be 
centered on two aspects of the North Korean economy lagging behind South Korea. The 
first is the gap of development in industry, agriculture, national infrastructure, and 
education. The overall costs associated with unification will be evaluated and compared 
with the South Korean Gross Domestic Product (GDP). To aid in this cost estimate, data 
compiled by the Korean Institute for National Unification (KINU) will be utilized to 
provide economic information regarding the two economies. 
The second area of focus will be the economic and governance costs that 
international sanctions have imposed on North Korea. International sanctions have been 
shown to cause the following: increased disputes; erosion of governance capacity; 
empowering of anti-reform leaders, factions, and disempowering civil society; increased 
                                                 
1 Kathrine Lam, “North and South Korea to March Together in Winter Olympics Opening Ceremony 
Under Unification Flag,” Fox News, January 17, 2018, https://www.foxnews.com/world/2018/01/17/north-
and-south-korea-to-march-together-in-winter-olympics-opening-ceremony-under-unification-flag.html. 
2 
likelihood of violence; potential humanitarian effects; and detrimental economic impacts 
on the country, region, and its allies.2  North Korea’s prolonged exposure to international 
sanctions has made them vulnerable to each of these costs. This thesis assumes that the 
sanctions will be incrementally lifted as the unification process proceeds. Comparison 
data will be evaluated using Iran as a case study to show the relationship that economic 
sanctions can have on an economy. 
Findings show that North Korean economic policy decisions are largely 
responsible for the DPRK’s economic plight. Since the division between North and South 
Korea, the DPRK leadership has consistently enacted economic policy decisions that can 
be characterized as short-sighted. These policy decisions often ignore, or are unaware, of 
the long-term consequences that they will create. While short-sighted, they are consistent 
in an attempt to maintain self-sufficiency despite a growing sense of insecurity. Decisions 
to maintain a strong military industrial complex and pursue nuclear weapons have 
resulted in international and economic isolation.   
North Korea’s decisions to pursue nuclear weapons have transformed the country 
into a target for multilateral economic sanctions. Studies show that until recently 
economic sanctions have had very little impact upon deterring the North Korean 
leadership from pursuing its nuclear weapon program. North Korean leadership has 
placed the development of nuclear weapons on par with that of economic development. 
By doing so, North Korea continues to increase its international isolation and increase the 
disparity between North Korean and South Korean GDP. Similarly, inducements and 
engagement strategies have also failed to convince North Korea to abandon its weapons 
program leaving little chance that a solution will be found to denuclearize the Korean 
Peninsula.   
The unwillingness of North Korea to give up nuclear weapons leaves little room 
that a peaceful unification scenario can occur. Instead, it creates an environment of rising 
                                                 
2 William Luers, Iris Bieri and Priscilla Lewis, “Weighing the Benefits and Costs of International 
Sanctions Against Iran,” The Iran Project, https://www.scribd.com/document/115678817/IranReport2-
120312-2#fullscreen. 
3 
tensions. Under these circumstances, unification is far more likely to occur under a crisis 
scenario. 
B. SIGNIFICANCE OF THE RESEARCH QUESTION 
According to a 2016 Unification Perception Survey conducted by Seoul National 
University for Peace and Unification Studies, 53.4 percent responded by saying that 
unification of the peninsula was necessary while 22.0 percent felt that unification wasn’t 
necessary.3  These numbers reflect a 2.4 percent increase from a similar unification 
perception survey conducted in 2015.4  However, the staggering economic and political 
costs associated with uniting the two countries remains a barrier today. To some these 
barriers have caused a number of people to rethink the necessity of reunification.5  While 
many Koreans favor and support the reunification of the peninsula, the manner and 
timing in which unification will happen continues to be studied in order to plan for 
measures that will need to be taken. Proper planning will help to prevent instability 
within the peninsula, as well as mitigate a possible humanitarian crisis and/or social 
disturbance from occurring.   
The reunification of Germany in 1990 shows that a national unification process 
will bring many problems that must be planned and accounted for. Examining different 
potential scenarios will allow for Korea to prepare for the future and help to shed light on 
what will be required for a successful unification. In the event of unification, some of the 
factors that must be looked at and planned for include:  rapid distribution of food and 
emergency supplies to prevent crisis, establishing institution and aid structures capable of 
preventing mass migration to South Korea and China, dismantling of the military in a 
manner that prevents violence and crime from erupting, planning considerations for how 
                                                 
3 Keunsik Jung et al., Unification Perception Survey 2016 (Seoul:  Institute for Peace and Unification 
Studies, 2017), 34. 
4 Jung et al., 34. 
5 Jung et al., 34. 
4 
to handle government and party elites post reunification, and planning for markets and 
government structures capable of re-integrating into the international community.6   
Additional implications for reunification emerge from the fact that North Korea’s 
pursuit of its nuclear and weapons programs have made it a frequent and long-time target 
of international sanctions. More than two decades worth of sanctions since North Korea 
has removed itself from the Nuclear Proliferation Treaty in 1993 mean that the effects of 
these sanctions on the North Korean economy and regime can be evaluated. 
Economically, North Korea has suffered under sanctions and has been restricted in its 
ability to import and export certain critical items such as coal and oil. Lifting the 
international sanctions from North Korea will allow for increased economic activity to 
emerge. This will result in increased opportunities to engage in international trade with 
China, South Korea, and others allowing the North to normalize international relations. 
Moreover, economic activity is only one cost associated with sanctions. Additionally, 
removal of sanctions can impact the regime’s source of legitimacy and social stability 
and allow new factions to rise to power.  
C. LITERATURE REVIEW 
Scholarly research concerning reunification of the Korean Peninsula has led to 
different definitions being used to define reunification and debate as to how a process of 
reunification might officially occur. The literature review that follows will begin by 
offering definitions for unification and cost of unification that will be used through this 
thesis. Following these definitions four different potential scenarios for reunification will 
be discussed. These reunification scenarios will lead into a discussion about the German 
reunification and the similarities that exist between Korea and Germany. The literature 
review will conclude by discussing the impacts of sanctions and inducements and how 
this relates towards reunification. 
                                                 
6 Byung-Yeon Kim and Gerard Roland, “Scenarios for a Transition to a Prosperous Market Economy 
in North Korea,” International Economic Journal 26, no. 3 (September 2012): 513–517.   
5 
1. Definition of Unification and Unification Costs 
Before discussing unification scenarios or the total cost of unification of the 
Korean Peninsula it is necessary to define what these terms mean. Various institutions 
have presented different models and costs associated with unification. In virtually all the 
models presented, only capital costs are calculated.7  Capital costs under these 
circumstances are defined as those that will contribute to bridge the gap of Gross 
Domestic Product (GDP) per capita between North and South Korea. These costs 
normally include: emergency relief, construction of infrastructure, provision of education 
and health care, and integration of institutions.8  Costs directly associated with purposes 
such as humanitarian aid, social, and psychological costs are ignored for calculating 
unification cost scenarios.   
Definitions for when unification will be said to have occurred officially vary 
between scholars. One definition of unification, presented by Wolf and Akramov, defines 
unification to occur when the North Korean GDP per capita doubles.9  Under Wolf and 
Akramov’s definition, unification is assumed to occur over a five year period and achieve 
complete convergence with South Korea after 20 years.10  After GDP per capita doubles, 
it is assumed that capital transfers between the North and South and the rest of the world 
would proceed “in more or less familiar ways that such transactions typically occur in 
internal and international commerce.”11  Other studies which use models to determine 
the cost of Korean reunification set similar ratios of North Korean GDP in comparison 
with South Korea. A second method to estimate cost of Korean reunification utilizes an 
aggregate cost method. Aggregate cost estimates calculate the total expenses needed to 
                                                 
7 Charles Wolf and Kamil Akramov, North Korean Paradoxes: Circumstances, Costs, and 
Consequences of Korean Unification (Pittsburgh:  RAND Corporation, 2005), 46. 
8 Byung-Yeon Kim, Unveiling the North Korean Economy: Collapse and Transition (Cambridge:  
University Printing House, 2017), 293. 
9 Wolf and Akramov, North Korean Paradoxes: Circumstances, Costs, and Consequences of Korean 
Unification, 48. 
10 Wolf and Akramov, 46. 
11 Wolf and Akramov, 47. 
6 
achieve unification. Using these methods, Korean reunification models calculate the total 
cost between 50 and 3,947 billion USD.12  These estimates correspond to annual South 
Korean GDP payments of 3.8 to 12.0 percent.13  The extreme cost range between these 
estimates does not allow individual unification studies to be compared, but instead must 
be examined individually. Variations such as the time allotted for unification to occur, 
and the nature of unification (gradual versus radical) greatly influence the final cost 
estimation. 
2. Unification Scenarios 
Unification of the Korean Peninsula remains a focus of study today dating back to 
the division of the peninsula in 1945. In general, the many uncertainties surrounding 
North Korea, as well as its internal operations and stability, has prompted several 
unification scenarios to arise. Among scholars there are four general theories for how 
unification of the peninsula could take place. These scenarios include: “unification 
through peaceful integration and negotiation, unification through absorption following a 
collapse, unification through conflict or war, and sustained disequilibrium and potential 
external intervention.”14  Peaceful integration and negotiation scenarios are considered to 
be the cheapest form of unification as the need to provide social safety nets will decrease. 
In contrast, transition achieved through conflict or collapse of government will require 
immediate social safety nets to be put into place to prevent a major humanitarian crisis.   
Each scenario brings a distinct set of requirements for a successful unification. 
Across scenarios, a comparative framework is necessary that assesses: “(1) major 
characteristics, (2) potential indicators, (3) preferred and variant paths, and (4) strategic 
implications which include current and future regional geopolitics.”15  Each method of 
unification would incur different costs, and likely prompt different reactions from the 
                                                 
12 Kim, Unveiling the North Korean Economy: Collapse and Transition, 293. 
13 Kim, 293. 
14 Jonathan Pollack and Min-Lee Chung, Preparing for Korean Unification (New York: Amacom, 
2010), 45. 
15 Pollack and Chung, 46. 
7 
international community. Among the major countries likely to be affected under these 
scenarios are China, Japan, South Korea, North Korea, and the United States.   
3. The German Reunification Experience 
The reunification of East and West Germany in 1990 sparked renewed interest 
and research into looking at the costs and consequences associated with unification. 
Many parallels exist between German and Korean unification. In both cases, the two 
sides (East and West Germany on one hand, and North and South Korea on the other 
hand) share a language and culture, only to have been subject to a protracted separation. 
The divided nations also have the shared experience of two separate economic systems:  
centrally planned, regimented economic systems in East Germany and North Korea; and 
market systems integrated with the global economy in West Germany and South 
Korea.16   
Equally important in comparing German reunification to Korean reunification are 
the dissimilarities that exist. Some dissimilarities include the population, size of 
economy, communication, and military strengths. In 1990, East Germany’s population 
was about one fourth that of West Germany. Today, North Korea’s population is 
estimated at approximately half that of South Korea. East Germany’s economy was 
estimated at about 8–9 percent that of West Germany while North Korea’s economy is 
estimated at 3–5 percent of South Korea.17   Another notable difference between 
Germany and Korea is that the extent of trade, communication, and flow of information 
was much greater between East and West Germany than is observed today between North 
and South Korea. All of these factors suggest that the economic costs of the reunification 
of Korea will be larger than that experienced by Germany. 
Nevertheless, valuable lessons can be learned from the German unification 
experience. German unification costs have been estimated at “about 1.4 trillion deutsche 
                                                 
16 Pollack and Chung, 51. 
17 Pollack and Chung, 51. 
8 
marks (DM) by 2000 and added an additional 1 billion DM each year through 2004.”18  
These costs accounted for approximately 5–6 percent of West Germany’s GDP per year 
while undergoing reunification.19  According to the 2016 World Atlas report, similar 
costs today would cost South Korea between 69 and 83 billion USD annually.20  The 
large cost has become a deterrent for contemplating the costs to reunify Korea in the fear 
that the actual costs would ultimately be much higher. One factor that contributed to the 
high German reunification cost this was through establishing a parity between the 
deutsche mark and the ostmark immediately despite the significant disparity between the 
two currencies valued between 3:1 and 4:1.21  Establishing currency parity damaged East 
Germany’s economy through reducing the East Germany’s ability to remain competitive 
in the marketplace, increased social welfare costs, and introduced inflation.   Kim and 
Roland suggest that an alternative would be to allow the currency exchange rates between 
the two Koreas to stabilize at market prices, thereby facilitating free trade between the 
countries. In turn, capital would flow into the North in order to take advantage of cheap 
labor and markets, thereby stimulating growth for the North.22 
Kim and Roland also suggest the importance of providing incentives on a scale 
large enough to encourage North Koreans to remain in North Korea while discouraging 
migration into China or South Korea.23  These incentives could include providing social 
safety nets and land redistribution sufficient to prevent a flood of immigrants. Social 
safety nets would provide government subsidies and guaranteed loans to cover private 
entrepreneurial expenses and state-owned enterprises for a period of time—and this 
                                                 
18 Wolf and Akramov, North Korean Paradoxes: Circumstances, Costs, and Consequences of Korean 
Unification, 28. 
19 Wolf and Akramov, 52. 
20 “South Korea GDP,” World Atlas, May 9, 2017, https://www.worldatlas.com/finance/south-korea/
gdp.html. 
21 Wolf and Akramov, North Korean Paradoxes: Circumstances, Costs, and Consequences of Korean 
Unification, 28. 
22 Byung-Yeon Kim and Gerard Roland, “Scenarios for a Transition to a Prosperous Market Economy 
in North Korea,” 515–516. 
23 Kim and Roland, 515–516.  
9 
would incur less costs upon the government than having to provide for the 
unemployed.24  Land redistribution would grant ownership of the land to North Koreans 
but would not be transferrable until a certain amount of time has passed as defined by the 
South Korean Government. As some North Koreans would inevitably want to migrate to 
the South, these incentives would be forfeit for those that leave the North.25  
4. Sanctions and Inducements 
Sanctions have been employed historically for a wide range of purposes which are 
predominantly economic but also can include political and military causes.26  Common 
reasons for sanctions to be implemented are “to discourage proliferation of weapons of 
mass destruction and ballistic missiles, promote human rights, end support for terrorism, 
thwart drug trafficking, discourage armed aggression, protect the environment, and oust 
governments.”27  For these reasons, North Korea has been frequently targeted for 
international sanctions to discourage such actions. Global evidence has shown that 
economic sanctions have proven to work only about a third of the time.28  Further 
sanctions have been able to become more effective when they can be narrowly targeted in 
order to only affect certain groups or individuals.   
The overall effectiveness of sanctions is in part dependent upon the target regime 
type and upon the level of enforcement. The desired outcome of a sanction is much less 
likely to occur if the regime can impose the costs on the citizenry.29  For this reason 
broad sanctions are often ineffective because the costs can be transferred by certain 
regime types to the public as a whole. Regime types which can impose the costs upon its 
                                                 
24 Kim and Roland, 515–516. 
25 Kim and Roland, 515–516. 
26 Richard Haass, “Sanctioning Madness,” Foreign Affairs 76, no. 2 (December 1997): 74. 
27 Haass, 74. 
28 Haass, 76. 
29 Stephan Haggard and Marcus Noland, Hard Target: Sanctions, Inducements, and the Case of North 
Korea (Stanford, CA:  Stanford University Press, 2017), 19. 
10 
citizenry have been classified as “hard targets.”30   Under these circumstances, sanctions 
are most likely to be effective if they can be targeted at the political leadership.   
Another way to increase the efficacy of sanctions is to avoid unilateral 
sanctions.31 Multilateral sanctions have been shown to be more effective as it eases the 
economic burden of enforcing the sanctions while also lessening the resources of any 
given country necessary to enforce them. 
One alternative to sanctions are inducements, often viewed as less hostile 
measures than sanctions because they provide increased incentives for compliance. 
Inducements work to effectively change the cost-benefit ratio of the decision-making 
process.32  Inducements can offer an effective form of engagement that is willing to offer 
concessions in return for gradual compliance. For “hard-target” states inducements can 
come in the form of humanitarian aid, reduced sanctions and penalties, and increased 
foreign economic assistance. 
D. POTENTIAL EXPLANATIONS AND HYPOTHESES 
This thesis will focus on assessing the economic costs associated with the first 
scenario: unification through peaceful integration and negotiation which occurs 
gradually.33  Resting on the causal expectation that this first scenario is most plausible, 
the impact of international sanctions can be further analyzed towards the impact of 
peaceful unification. This thesis also rests on the causal expectation that South Korea will 
take the lead on all matters concerning unification. 
Gradual transition to unification presents the most likely peaceful scenario to 
occur. Under this scenario social safety nets can be implemented to minimize the number 
of North Koreans leaving and prevent the outbreak of a social crisis or humanitarian issue 
from developing. Members of the regime would be able to be employed as members of 
                                                 
30 Haggard and Noland, 20. 
31 Haass, “Sanctioning Madness,” 77. 
32 Haggard and Noland, Hard Target: Sanctions, Inducements, and the Case of North Korea, 17. 
33 Pollack and Chung, Preparing for Korean Unification, 46. 
11 
the bureaucracy overseeing the North through the transition years and military members 
could ensure the peace. Additionally, this would provide ample time for inducements to 
encourage transition and sanctions to be removed. By doing so, North Korea would be 
gradually allowed to re-enter the international community as a normal member able to 
trade and sell its goods until complete unification has occurred. 
By contrast, peaceful rapid unification is not possible due to the extreme 
divergence of North and South Korea. Rapid unification led by the North would require 
that South Korea remove their democratically elected government and removal from the 
international global economy in favor of a state-sponsored economy. Rapid unification 
led by the South would entail dismissal of many of the elite members of the Korean 
Workers Party, and subsequent disarmament of the large military complex that has been 
created in the North. Both of these situations are untenable. The South has become 
accustomed to a rapid increase in living conditions and has developed a sense of pride in 
their ability to mobilize for public protests. Recently, this can best be seen in the 
successful impeachment of South Korea’s President Park in 2016. For the North, many 
elite members would find themselves without governmental protection and face charges 
of humanitarian crimes. Additionally, the economic elite of North Korea would find little 
use of their skills in a highly developed South Korean economy. Rapid dismissal of the 
Korean Workers Party without allowing a buffer time to adjust to the changes would 
likely lead to violence, riots, and mass emigration to China and South Korea prompting 
massive international assistance. 
Additionally, it is unlikely that reunification of the Korean Peninsula could be 
achieved through forceful regime collapse. The division of North and South Korea carries 
with it a legacy of the Cold War. The most likely international actors to become involved 
under this hypothesis would be the United States, China, or Japan. The Korean Peninsula 
is a modern division between socialism and capitalism. As such, China “has three priority 
interests on the Korean Peninsula: maintaining peace, preserving stability, and promoting 
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denuclearization.”34  Destabilization could result in a political or economic emergency 
triggering refugee flows into China and leading up to a humanitarian crisis or social 
instability.35  Social instability or a humanitarian crisis would be likely to prompt 
intervention from the United States military. This scenario would be unacceptable to 
China as it poses a security risk to China’s economic, political, and military stability. 
Thus, the most plausible expectation regarding Korean reunification is that it 
occurs gradually through peaceful integration and negotiation. The thesis will examine 
the underlying economic challenges associated with this model of reunification and 
assess the potential costs of reunification. 
E. RESEARCH DESIGN 
As limited raw data is available regarding the North Korean economy, the method 
of research will draw heavily from secondary source analyses of the current state of the 
North Korean economy. Defector testimonies are important for providing insights into 
the operation of the North Korean regime and size and growth of the informal economy 
that exists. These data are known to be imperfect due to personal bias and lack of 
information but are able to provide insight to general trends that are present. 
Because unification of the Korean Peninsula has not occurred yet, the German 
reunification experience case study will be used to help highlight how such a unification 
can occur. Case study information on international sanctions will also be utilized to help 
determine the impact that sanctions have had on the North Korean economy. 
International sanctions that have been enforced in Iran and Iraq offer similar comparisons 
that can be drawn as more information is available on these countries and provide 
economic impacts. Both Iran and Iraq have been subjected recently to modern UN 
sanctions to varying degrees of effectiveness and outcomes. While much of the North 
Korean economic numbers are unavailable to be analyzed, these case studies can be used 
to help determine the effectiveness of current sanctions imposed on North Korea. 
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F. THESIS OVERVIEW AND DRAFT CHAPTER OUTLINE 
This thesis is organized in five chapters. This first chapter has offered a brief 
introduction presenting the thesis question, objectives, and the significance of the 
question as it pertains to the reunification of the Korean Peninsula.   
The second chapter offers an overview of the history and early economic policies 
enacted by North Korea. To do this, the chapter begins by illustrating the circumstances 
under which Korea was divided and the rationale behind fighting the Korean War. 
Chapter II follows North Korea policies through the rebuilding from the Korean War, the 
collapse of the economy in the 1990s and its attempts to rebuild afterwards. 
The third chapter analyzes how sanctions have contributed to the state of the 
North Korean economy. Economic sanctions further contribute to the deteriorating North 
Korean economy through limiting economic growth through trade. Through denial of 
North Korean goods, the DPRK is constrained from fully developing its economy due to 
shortfalls in cash gained through exports and difficulty in importing needed goods. Case 
studies of economic sanctions placed upon Iran are used as a comparison for the costs 
associated with economic sanctions and for understanding of when economic sanctions 
are most likely to succeed at achieving their strategic objective. This analysis highlights 
the incentive for the North Korean case and potential benefits which through lifting of 
sanctions. 
The fourth chapter compares the South Korean economy against the North 
Korean economy. A German reunification case study is used to show the similarities 
which exist and further illustrate the difficulty of unifying the two countries. Chapter IV 
concludes with estimates and scenarios under which reunification can occur.  
The fifth chapter concludes by summarizing the key findings and discusses the 
implications that this has upon major international actors including the United States and 
China. 
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II. THE NORTH KOREAN ECONOMY 
The history of North Korea gave life and power to Kim Il-Sung and what would 
later become the Kim Dynasty. The history and narrative of North Korea help to shed 
light on the path and policy decisions that have been made. The narrative of North Korea 
has helped to influence many of the policies enacted under the Kim Dynasty. By gaining 
a better understanding of the history of North Korea and its leaders, the present-day 
issues such as pursuing nuclear weapons, or continuing to remain isolated from 
information become clearer. Understanding why decisions are made can help influence 
future decisions such as embark upon reunification.   
The remainder of this chapter begins by outlining a brief history of the division of 
the Korean Peninsula and the subsequent Korean War. These two historic events have 
been critical to the shaping and influencing the development of the North Korean 
economy. The chapter then proceeds to describe North Korean policy decisions and how 
they setup the prerequisite conditions which established the conditions for economic 
collapse, a devastating famine, and the following emergence of an informal economy.   
A. DIVISION OF THE KOREAN PENINSULA 
1. North and South Divided 
The origins of a single unified Korea date back to 676 AD when the kingdom of 
Silla, along with the help of Tang, a Chinese dynasty, were able to defeat Goguryeo and 
Baekje. Modern Korean history, culture, and language can all be traced back through the 
subsequent dynasties. Independent, unified Korea ended with the last emperor of the 
Chosun dynasty being forced to sign an annexation treaty with Japan in 1910 signifying 
the beginning of the Japanese occupation of Korea.36 
The occupation of Korea continued until 1945 with Japan’s defeat during World 
War II. Following the surrender of Japan, liberation of Korea ended with negotiations 
settled between the United States and the Soviet Union which divided the country into a 
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trusteeship. According to this arrangement, the Soviet Union would control the north and 
the United States would be given control of the southern region. The division of the 
country was strongly opposed by Koreans who were left without a voice in the decision 
to divide the country.37  The division of the peninsula kindled a desire in both the north 
and south to eventually unify the country as one. This desire to unify remained intact 
even as road blockades and barriers were installed fortifying the divide restricting all 
unauthorized trade and travel between the north and south.     
This political decision to divide the country laid the foundations for the 
economies which would later emerge in both North and South Korea. The American 
decision to divide the country stemmed from fear, that if left unchecked, communism 
would continue to spread and threaten the American way of life. This divide prevented 
the spread of communism across the entire Korean Peninsula. Fearing that the Soviet 
Union would take possession of the entire Korean Peninsula following the unconditional 
surrender of Japan, the United States arbitrarily drew a line across the 38th parallel as a 
division point while keeping the Korean capital, Seoul, in the southern region.38  This 
separating line was drawn in order to split Korea approximately in two granting equal 
political influence from the United States and Soviet Union. The 38th parallel dividing 
line was a military decision without regard for any other political concerns such as 
economic importance, population distance, historical claims, or ethnic consideration.39  
The divide was approved by President Truman on 13 August and was sent to Moscow for 
subsequent approval.40 Surprising many, the Soviets agreed to the decision to divide the 
country along the 38th parallel.   
The decision to split the peninsula set the stage for the future economic policies 
and systems that developed across both the southern and northern regions of Korea. This 
divide split the population, leaving roughly one-third in the north and the other two-thirds 
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in the southern region (7.9 million and 15.6 million respectively).41  Additionally, this 
divide introduced a massive economic shock and hardships to both regions. The divide 
left most of the mineral resources, heavy industry, and 92 percent of the electricity being 
generated in the North.42  While the South retained the bulk of food and light industry 
production. By comparison, the southern region produced 65 percent of food and 80 
percent of all consumer goods leaving the north with only 35 percent of food production 
and 20 percent of all consumer goods manufactured.43  The North however was 
producing 95 percent of steel and 85 percent of all chemicals being manufactured pre-
divide.44    
 The unequal nature of the split and the influence of the Soviet Union encouraged 
the North to adopt an economy modeled after that of the Soviet Union. The Soviet 
influence upon the North helped to focus their efforts to pursue heavy industry to help 
further industrialize and develop their economy. The South’s economy, by contrast, 
became heavily influenced by the United States. With little access to electricity and 
heavy industry, the South turned their focus onto developing a market-oriented economy. 
Receiving both economic and military aid from the United States allowed for the 
beginnings of a market-oriented society to emerge. With access given to the United States 
markets the South had large markets in which they could continue to pursue and sell their 
consumer goods. 
2. Lasting Effects of the Korean War on the North Korean Political 
Economy 
Many policies which helped to shape the early North Korean economy can be 
traced back and attributed to after-effects of the Korean War. The war, which began as an 
effort to reunify the divided country under Korean leadership, ended instead by further 
reinforcing the divide that separated the North and South. The economic advantages that 
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North Korea initially inherited were shattered through the massive civilian and military 
casualties sustained in the war. Additionally, any industrial advantages in the North were 
destroyed through the massive bombing campaign from the United States.  
 While the extent of the losses from the Korean War is unknown, estimates 
approximate that between 10 and 15 percent of the total North Korean population 
perished.45  With an initial population of 10 million, an estimated 300,000 North Korean 
soldiers were killed through the course of the war.46  It’s estimated that as many as 1.5 
million Chinese and North Koreans were killed during the fighting.47   This initial loss of 
life would leave a lasting impact upon the labor force of North Korea as it tried to rebuild 
following the armistice of 1953. 
 Perhaps the largest lasting impact of the war was the destruction of the major 
industrial centers and cities.   Over the course of the war, the United States dropped 
635,000 bombs and an additional 32,000 tons of napalm.48  Official U.S. estimates of the 
destruction describe 18 of the 22 largest North Korean Cities destroyed between 50 and 
90 percent.49  This destruction included the capital city, Pyongyang, major industrial 
centers, and critical infrastructure. This extensive destruction further increased North 
Korea’s economic dependency upon the Soviet Union to rebuild the shattered country. 
 Despite the damage inflicted upon North Korea, the war strengthened Kim Il 
Sung’s hold on power. Andrei Lankov wrote that this war “untied the hands of” Kim Il 
Sung by weakening the political influence that the Soviet Union would hold over North 
Korea.50  While China sent military aid to North Korea, China ultimately left the 
domestic politics of North Korea alone. This act allowed North Korea to become military 
dependent upon China and consequently increased North Korea’s political independence 
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from the Soviet Union. Stalin’s order to retreat into Manchuria during the war may have 
further influenced Kim Il Sung to rationalize that security would only come through 
becoming military self-sufficient. While Kim Il Sung ultimately failed to reunify the 
peninsula, he placed North Korea on a warlike path which placed a high value on 
security.   
B. “PLAN-LESS” PLANNED ECONOMY 
Following the 1953 armistice, North Korea enacted several policies that have had 
a detrimental impact in the North Korean economy. These policies turned one of the most 
industrialized countries of the 1940’s into one of the most isolated and economically 
backwards countries of the 20th century. These early policies would culminate with the 
disastrous floods and famines which ravaged North Korea in the 1990s. Many of the 
early economic policies which were implemented can be viewed as motivated by short-
term political rationales that downplayed long-term economic consequences. Two such 
decisions with grave future consequences were the unbalanced emphasis placed on heavy 
industry and the attachment to the juche ideology, which emphasized economic self-
sufficiency. 
In September of 1953, the CIA estimated that North Korea received  
US$250 million in aid from the Soviet Union.51  In December of that same year, the 
Soviet Union remitted North Korea’s war debts.52  North Korea is also estimated at 
receiving as much as US$500 million in loans and credit from China over the same 
decade.53  This money was used to help foster and rebuild North Korea following the 
destruction of the Korean War. Under the Soviet Union’s growth plan, half was to go to 
the military, 25 percent to heavy industry, and another 25 percent towards light industry. 
One economic policy choice of the North Koreans was to focus on heavy 
industry. This emphasis offered short-term benefits while often ignoring the long-term 
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consequences of not investing in agriculture and light industries. North Korea’s Three-
Year Economic Plan of 1954–1956 devoted 81 percent of all resources towards heavy 
industry leaving only 19 percent left to be used for light industry.54  This lopsided growth 
strategy allowed North Korea to rebuild most of its industrial capacity and cities by 
1957.55  However, such a large focus on heavy industry proved unsustainable over the 
long-term. The extensive capital required for this strategy strained relations with the 
Soviet Union and China. 
 North Korea’s lopsided emphasis on heavy industry became a reason of concern 
for the Soviet Union. This development plan required extensive capital to be imported 
and lead down a path which would be ultimately unsustainable for long-term economic 
growth. Diverting so many resources to heavy industry required mobilization of labor. 
This massive mobilization came at the expense of the work forces in agriculture and light 
industry. Prior to the mobilization, North Korean farmers managed to produce enough 
food to feed its population. Estimates place this requirement between 5.0 and 5.5 annual 
million metric tons of grain.56 Through the early 1990s, North Korea continued to 
manage to feed its people. However, torrential rains and flooding led to a nation-wide 
food shortage. The North Korean grain yield in 1996 is estimated at 2.5 and 2.8 million 
metric tons of grain in 1996.57  Massive food shortages were felt throughout the country.     
A second detrimental impact upon North Korea’s ability to maintain self-
sufficiency to feed itself resulted from a state-controlled agricultural sector. North Korean 
farms relied upon large amounts of chemical fertilizers, and artificial irrigation systems to 
operate.58  North Korea initially benefitted from its chemical fertilizer factories and 
pumping stations, which were built under Japanese occupation, but a decline in relations 
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with the Soviet Union left North Korea without access to cheap energy necessary to run 
its fertilizer factories or pumping stations. This end-result was that North Korean farmers 
were deprived of the water and fertilizer needed to farm the non-arable lands. 
A third policy of North Korean farms which later became detrimental was the 
terraced farm system which borrowed heavily from Chinese farming.59  The terraced 
farm system allowed North Koreans to access previously inaccessible land and raise the 
potential overall yield of food. However, it was later discovered that terracing had a 
negative consequence which increased overall soil-erosion. Terracing removed North 
Korea’s protection from the elements and increased its vulnerability to natural weather 
conditions. The torrential rains of 1995–1996 were proved significant by destroying 1.9 
million tons of grain and causing $15 billion USD in damage.60  
 Another side effect of overinvesting into heavy industry was North Korea’s lack 
of trading partners. The Soviet Union and China virtually became North Korea’s sole 
trading partners throughout the Cold War years.61  The North Korean Regime would 
view this as a trade-based vulnerability.62  This vulnerability influenced North Korea to 
divert resources toward restoring industries deemed to constitute a basis of national 
power. Vulnerability to foreign influences pressured North Korea’s decision to pursue a 
heavy industrial complex to augment domestic national security and strengthen the 
growing North Korean military-industrial complex. 
One aspect of North Korea which eventually became an influential factor on 
decisions across all aspects of the North Korean sphere, including economic policies, was 
the invention of its own national ideology, Juche. Juche is normally translated as “self-
sufficiency,” but this can be misleading to its interpretation. Lankov argues that a better 
interpretation would be “self-importance” or “self-significance.”63  These later 
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translations help to better understand the importance given to national interests and 
peculiarities which only exist in North Korea. Under the guise of Juche, North Korea 
policy decisions emphasized self-sufficiency in food, agriculture, and light 
manufacturing.   
Juche ideology manifested itself in the North Korean economy through the 
Chollima Movement which was introduced in 1958 and stayed in effect until 1961. This 
movement centered around the idea that “any shortfalls could be made up for by the 
‘revolutionary zeal’ of the people, which resulted in superhuman productivity gains that 
could outpace that of any other economy.”64  This movement was introduced because of 
decreased material support and funding from the Soviet Union. Under this movement, 
technological advancement was replaced by longer working hours. Subsequent shortfalls 
were believed to be able to be overcome through a concentrated mobilization of the 
people. This movement ultimately encouraged inefficiencies to be incorporated into all 
facets of the economy. Increased productivity was equated with increased working hours 
of the laborers rather than investment in more efficient technology.   
Under this movement, coal powerplants were embraced to utilize the resources 
found within the country while providing electricity to the people. However, failure to 
invest into more efficient technologies amounted to frequent power outages from a 
shortage of coal needed to operate the power plants. The North Koreans could only 
excavate five to six tons of coal a day, while continuous operated coal excavator 
technology at the time could extract exponentially more coal using only a fraction of the 
labor.65  Inability to supply the powerplants further strained the economy through 
introducing frequent power outages. Limited power availability forced factory output 
below capacity. Prolonged operation below capacity further weakened the North Korean 
economy and increased supply shortages. Shortages in supply would diminish 
agricultural output and revenue obtained through exportation of goods. 
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Policy attempts to increase meat and dairy supplies also proved to be short-
sighted. Fearing an increased shortage of dairy and meat products, the political decision 
was made to import goats. This decision also proved to be short-sighted and created long-
term devastating effects.   
North Korea’s rugged landscape contains only 20 percent arable land.66  The lack 
of arable land poses a challenge to raising cows which require large fields to graze on. 
Goats became the alternative to cows which would provide a supply of both meat and 
dairy products. The goats were able to graze on the shrubs which grew in the 
mountainous terrain. Almost overnight the goat population doubled and would triple 
within a two-year span.67   
The short-term outlook to increasing the goat population provided a source of 
meat, cheese, and milk from the goats. However, the long-term effects came about as the 
goats denuded the shrubs and plant-life, which protected against the annual rains. 
Lacking natural protection from the annual rain, severe flooding destroyed much of the 
little arable land and flooded the coal mines wiping out one readily available energy 
source.68 
After realizing the shortfalls of running a centrally planned economy, North 
Korean officials adapted the economic system to emphasize the common effort of 
workers to increase productivity and self-reliance of firms. This became known as the 
Daean Management System, which was named for an electronics firms that Kim Il-Sung 
visited in 1961.69  The Daean Management System rested on three principles. The first 
established that political priorities would take precedence over economic priorities. 
Second, this system deemphasized material rewards. Instead, emphasis was placed on the 
moral and spiritual benefits of hard-work. The third principle increased the influence of 
the Korean Workers’ Party Committee over that of the management and supervision. 
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Under this system, the Korean Workers’ Party Committee gained the decision making 
and dominance over the operation of firms.   
The Daean Management System sought to implement practical changes to 
improve efficiency. Firms that supplied raw materials and intermediate goods were 
established to eliminate chronic shortages which plagued the North Korean economy. 
However, shortages in planning and an increasingly complex economy would ultimately 
lead to increasing severity of shortages and difficulties in supplying the critical inputs 
needed for North Korea’s economic plans to succeed. 
The drive for self-reliance continued to compound North Korea’s economic 
problems. The North Korean narrative of self-reliance required a strong military to 
survive. The net result was an increasingly reckless approach to managing the economy. 
To fuel the growth of the military, resources were diverted away from other areas of the 
economy such as light industry and agriculture. Despite having half the population of 
South Korea, North Korea spent more on military expenses each year than South Korea 
from 1968 to 1979.70  Over these same years, the armed forces swelled from 485,000 to 
680,000.71  Along with personnel, North Korea invested heavily into developing its Scud 
missile program, submarine and surface fleet, rockets and artillery, armored personnel 
carriers, and other combat equipment. By 1992, North Korea had double the number of 
tanks and artillery that the US-ROK forces had combined.72 
To pay for the dramatic buildup of force, the North turned towards implementing 
an import substitution economic policy. Borrowing money from foreign countries they 
attempted to import large plants, machinery, and other technology as an attempt to catch 
up with the Western countries. However, decreasing prices on nonferrous metals, one of 
North Korea’s primary exports, resulted in an inability to pay back its debts in the late 
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1970s.73  North Korea’s self-reliance policies prevented it from taking other rational 
actions such as selling bonds to pay off its debts. North Korea’s debt today is estimated at 
$12.5 billion and is not expected to be paid off by the international community.74   
The debt problem that North Korea experienced in the mid-1970s complicated its 
ability to continue to acquire capital goods. North Korea’s inability or unwillingness to 
pay back foreign debts eventually resulted in substantially reduced subsidies and 
economic aid from a frustrated Soviet Union in the mid-1980s.75 In a desperate attempt 
to continue to accumulate foreign capital the DPRK promulgated in 1984 a Joint Venture 
Law designed to attract foreign investment. This act attracted 148 instances of foreign 
investment at an estimated value of US$200 million.76  However, the majority of this 
came from ethnic Korean residents from Japan.77  
Failing to attract a large sum of foreign investment, North Korea turned to the 
Soviet Union to renew economic cooperation between the two countries. This too would 
prove to be short-lived. Soviet subsidies to North Korea collapsed with the liquidation of 
the Soviet Union in the 1990s.78 By 1993, Soviet Union imports fell to only 10 percent of 
their 1987–1990 average.79 The collapse of the Soviet Union released an economic 
shockwave through North Korea. Previously subsidized inputs into the DPRK 
disappeared. Subsidized inputs, such as oil needed to operate the factories, became 
increasingly difficult to obtain. Failure to acquire these resources adversely affected the 
North Korean economy. Exports decreased between 50 and 60 percent between the years 
1990 through 1995.80 
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The dissolution of the Soviet Union left the DPRK with two fundamental choices:  
loosen the reins of the government and introduce economic reforms or continue to 
maintain the status quo by reinforcing the command economy.81  The DPRK elected to 
continue to pursue current policy and implemented the “Let’s eat two meals a day” 
campaign in an effort to stave off the decreasing amount of aid and subsidies available to 
the North Korean government. The regime maintained these policies until the famine 
came into full effect in the spring of 1995. After which, the government made pleas for 
international support claiming floods and natural disasters as the reason for the outreach.   
C. ECONOMIC COLLAPSE  
1. Famine and Economic Break Down 
The failure to attract large scale foreign investment and the breakdown of the 
Eastern bloc gave way to increasingly deteriorating conditions within North Korea, which 
eventually led to the breakdown of the established economic system. Making matters 
worse, in 1993, China who supplied 77 percent of oil imports and 68 percent of food 
imports to North Korea, demanded that payments be made in cash.82  Additionally, 
China withheld crucial exports of corn to North Korea in 1993.83  Payments in cash 
became increasingly difficult due to increased sanctions stemming from the nuclear 
crisis.   
Deteriorating economic conditions during this time placed the Public Distribution 
System (PDS) under severe stress leading to its eventual breakdown. PDS was a central 
controlling mechanism over the population controlling the distribution of critical 
consumable items including food and clothing. Prior to 1987, PDS distributed between 
700 and 800 grams of food daily for high ranking officials while the average urban 
population received as little as 600 and 700 grams daily.84  PDS distributions were 
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reduced by 10 percent in 1987 and again in 1992.85  By 1993, 30 percent of North 
Korean defector interviews state that PDS had stopped food distribution altogether.86  In 
1996, 93 percent of defector interviews would state that PDS had stopped distribution.87 
At the onset of the famine in 1994, PDS distributed 60 – 70 percent of all food to 
at highly subsidized prices. In 1992, a kilo of rice was .08 won through PDS.88  By 
comparison, a kilo of rice through the informal market system at the time sold for 25 
won.89  The market prices reflected a 300 percent increase and was comparable to about 
35 percent of the monthly salary.90  Most of the urban populations became dependent 
upon PDS for the distribution of their only access to food.   
Rural farmers only fared slightly better. Farmers had the ability to preharvest 
grain or focus their efforts on private plots which were allowed for state and cooperative 
farmers. By hiding the extra grain farmers could protect themselves in ways that were not 
available to the urban areas.   
Breakdown of PDS threatened one of the central pillars of control which the 
central government held over the population. PDS became a controlling mechanism over 
maintaining central control over the entirety of the population. By controlling the food 
and access to it, political and social control was maintained by the government. Central 
control allowed for a hierarchy to be established where high ranking officials, the 
military, and heavy laborers all received higher food distribution than the rest of the 
population. At the bottom of the hierarchy were children, the elderly, and the disabled 
who all had lesser caloric needs. Children, elderly, and the disabled would all become the 
most vulnerable to the effects of famine. 
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The following year placed the PDS under severe stress. The country experienced 
severe flooding in 1994 and 1995, which destroyed more than 1.5 million tons of grain.91  
Additionally, the flooding destroyed much of the critical infrastructure and 85 percent of 
North Korea’s electricity generating capacity.92  To cope with the destruction, the food 
ration size was reduced from 450 grams to 128 grams of food per day.93  By 1997, the 
average reported ration size was 30 grams of food per person daily.94  The absolute 
minimum number of grams required daily for a 1,600 calorie diet is 457 grams.95  The 
system that was originally the primary source of food for the population became 
restricted such that only six percent of the population had access to it. 
The breakdown of PDS and the inability to feed its population set in motion a 
famine that lasted from 1994 to 1998.96  While distribution of food varied from month to 
month based on farmers grain harvests, from 1994 to 1998 the average PDS distribution 
never reached the minimum 450 daily grams needed for survival. Unofficial estimates for 
the destruction of the famine range from 200,000 casualties to as many as three million 
North Koreans.97  These estimates place the death toll ranging from one percent to a 
staggering 16 percent of the population over this time.98  While deaths at the high end are 
thought to be exaggerated, closer analytical estimates place the number of deaths between 
600,000 and one million during this time period, which equates to three to five percent of 
the total population.99 
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2. Rise of the Informal Economy 
With the state unable to continue providing for the welfare of its population, 
informal marketplaces began to take greater importance out of desperation for 
survival.100  Private commerce emerged as a form of survival. In 1995 huge markets 
began to grow in major cities and became a focal point for economic life.101  At first, 
households began to barter for food with household items while farmers began to grow 
extra food on illicit plots of land. Household production would soon take over as a means 
of gaining family income. 
Believing that life would eventually return to normal, the able-bodied men 
continued to work at their state-held jobs.102  Married women, who were exempt for 
working for the state, became the primary market operators. It became quickly apparent 
that it was possible to make the equivalent of an annual salary in only a few days. 
Successful business women soon began to move up from retail into wholesale markets. 
By the early 2000s, new enterprises began to develop including: eateries, transportation, 
and storage facilities.103  In only a few short years, the North Korean markets became far 
more diverse and complex than in previous years. Small amounts of capital received from 
relatives outside of North Korea helped to transform and replace many of the state-owned 
enterprises which had previously dominated the state. 
Officially, privately-owned businesses do not exist in North Korea. Officially, 
businesses are considered by default state-owned businesses managed by relevant local 
government agencies. However, private investors can make deals with government 
officials. In return for hiring employees, buying equipment, and offering kickbacks to 
government officials, businesses can be run with little to no interference from 
government officials. While some earnings are expected to go towards the state budget, 
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the rest can be kept as profits. One study performed in 2009 estimates that 58.5 percent of 
restaurants and 51.3 percent of retail shops were privately operated.104 
The emergence and growth of the markets is characterized as a grassroots 
development which has had a substantial economic and social impact upon North Korea 
and its citizens. While official data is limited regarding the size of the markets today, it is 
estimated that between 30 and 50 percent of North Korea’s GDP came from market 
activity.105  70 Percent of household expenditures are made in the informal economy 
where supply and demand determines prices.106  What remains unclear is why these 
markets have been allowed to develop to the size they operate at today. Some critics 
argue that the government is supportive of the growth. Other critics take a stance that the 
government was powerless to stop marketization and so played a more passive role in 
allowing the markets to develop.107 From the mid-1990s until today, the markets have 
undergone distinct periods of government policy regarding their existence. 
From 1990–2002 the informal markets existence can be categorized as grudging 
tolerance permitted by the state. Private sales of grain were banned in 1957.108  Along 
with grain, many consumer goods were initially illegal including television, radio, and 
other electronics. As a result, much of the early activity occurring in the markets 
remained illegal. During this period, government crackdowns occurred infrequently and 
could result in the markets being closed for weeks at a time. However, as the food 
situation began to deteriorate, government officials would backtrack and resume a 
passive tolerance toward the operation and sales of food and grain. 
The next period of marketization occurred from 2002–2005. On July 1, the 
government unveiled the “Economic Management Improvement Measures of 1st July.”  
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Under these measures, legalization of certain market activities occurred, private goods 
were legalized for sale, and state-factory managers gained additional autonomy over their 
employees including the ability to raise salaries.   
Of note, the July 1 measures included the opening of the Sinuiju Special 
Economic Zone (SEZ). By designating Sinuiju as a SEZ, the government granted it 
certain rights and privileges that had not existed before under North Korean rule. This 
SEZ was given its own legal system, border controls, and banking system. To show the 
import that North Korea gave to this measure, it brought in a Chinese National, Yang 
Bin, to run the SEZ instead of appointing a North Korean official. 
While these measures showed some promise of reform, they would be short-lived. 
Manager authorities quickly lost their autonomy and the SEZ unraveled. The July 1st 
movement can be interpreted as an attempt to institutionalize markets without making a 
transition to a market economy.109  Market economies rely on private ownership and 
market coordination. The July 1st movement failed to introduce either of these. Failure to 
introduce these elements into the July 1st measures indicate that the government was 
unwilling to implement radical reforms or to recognize that private ownership and market 
coordination are essential to achieving growth which was needed to restore their failing 
economy.110 
2005–2009 government policies reflect an attempt by the central government to 
strengthen its control while undermining market activities. Policies implemented during 
this time frame restricted who was eligible to work in the markets, established market 
operating hours, increased enforcement on the sale of grain, and established maximum 
prices on foodstuffs.111  Males were forbidden from working in markets and age 
limitations were placed on females.112 
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November of 2009 introduced a currency reform in an attempt to directly attack 
markets. Under this reform, 100 won was exchanged to one won. Additionally, maximum 
amounts of currency conversion were established to reassert state-control. By placing 
upper limits on maximum currency exchange, business suppliers and individuals lost 
money that had been saved through gains in the market. The results of this currency 
reform led to decreased purchasing power of the consumers and deteriorating economic 
effects. Economic reforms and currency conversion reinforced the idea that the state 
continues to maintain total control over the economy.  
These policies would also be short-lived. Local party officials could be bribed 
from vendors to remain in business. Law enforcement was lax as it recognized the need 
to operate the markets. Public anger and declines in economic activity led to the 
authorities to reopen markets, declare the currency reform a failure, and the public 
execution of Pak Nam Ki, a high-level public official.113  
The market economy from 2010 to present continues to play an important role for 
North Korea’s economy. The acknowledged failure of the 2009 currency reforms have 
reverted the markets back to the reform era of 2005, which acknowledged the presence of 
markets. While attempts to reform private markets has not occurred since 2010, an 
unwary co-existence remains between the state and private enterprises.114  
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III. SANCTIONS AND NORTH KOREA 
 The potential success of Korean reunification is challenged by the economic 
sanctions imposed on North Korea. In short, these economic sanctions act to amplify the 
detrimental effects of the DPRK’s short-sighted economic policy choices. Failure to lift 
these sanctions will prevent North Korea, or a unified Korea, from enjoying the benefits 
of normalized economic relations. As a result, economic difficulties will not be alleviated 
merely by achieving successful unification. Instead, limitations on trade imports and 
exports will continue to deter growth and increase the overall costs of unification. 
Normalization of trade relationships will be necessary to maximize the growth and 
capacity of the economy.  
 This chapter begins examining the reasoning behind why economic sanctions 
have become a preferred policy choice and why they are frequently implemented to deal 
with rogue regimes. The chapter then follows with examining the conditions which make 
sanction regimes more likely to succeed, and in North Korea’s case why they have failed 
to achieve compliance. A case study examining sanctions imposed upon Iran will be used 
to compare the outcome with North Korea. This chapter concludes by illustrating the 
impact which economic sanctions have upon North Korea. 
A. WHY ARE SANCTIONS IMPLEMENTED? 
Since the termination of World War II, sanctions have become increasingly 
favored by policy-makers as a means of response when diplomacy fails. The decision to 
implement sanctions carries a price for the sanctioned as well as the sanctioner. However, 
the cost to implement sanctions for the sanctioner is often viewed as less than a direct 
military action while offering some action for international disputes. Reasons to 
implement sanctions vary, but in all cases, sanctions must be carefully considered before 
being enforced in order to achieve maximum effect while mitigating the consequences 
often associated with sanctions. Economic sanctions become favorable as foreign policy 
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options when military responses are either inappropriate or impossible to execute.115  
Reasons for implementation of sanctions vary but often include: restoring democratically 
elected leaders, restoration of territorial aggression, promotion of human rights, acts of 
terrorism, promoting disarmament, and persuading belligerents to peace negotiations.116 
Sanctions can be categorized as a blunt instrument which attempt to achieve a 
desired objective. There is no standardized international norm for the imposition of 
sanctions, nor how they will affect the sanctioned state.117  As such, sanctions do not 
always bring about the desired changes. Instead sanctions work to promote change in the 
social, political, or economic spheres of influence through denial of customary 
interactions, or the threat to deny such actions between states.118  Once implemented, the 
threat of additional sanctions, or perceived benefits for lifting the sanctions continues to 
serve as motivation for behavioral change.   
For a reasonable chance of behavioral change to occur, the sanctions must be 
communicated in a way which clearly outlines the policy objective of the sanction as well 
as the actions which can lift or ease the sanction. This “carrot and stick” method clearly 
defines to both the sanctioner and sanctioned the reasons for implementation of the 
sanctions and the inducements which can be received through compliance. Neta 
Crawford and Audie Klotz determined that compliance with sanctions will fall under one 
of four categories.119  The first and most often targeted source of gaining compliance 
through sanctions is compellence.120  Compellence can be achieved by raising the cost-
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benefit calculus associated with a specific policy. When the policy being targeted by 
sanctions is no longer viewed as cost-effective, then behavioral change is more likely to 
occur. In this way, change occurs by incrementing the cost of maintaining certain policies 
until the benefits no longer value the cost.   
The second method for achieving compliance is through normative 
communication.121 Normative communication seeks to appeal to the elites and 
policymakers through use of moral arguments against actions which are in violation 
against international norms. Normative arguments are posed to achieve common ground 
based through ideological concerns. The action of placing sanctions highlights the moral 
issue and seeks change. Under these conditions, the price of the sanction often is 
outweighed by the violation of moral standards. 
Resource denial is the third possibility for sanctions to be effective at changing 
behavior.122 This condition requires that the sanctioned state be dependent upon foreign 
materials to continue the action being opposed. Through sanctions, critical items needed 
for a continued policy can be interrupted. However, resource denial is further 
complicated by constraining targeted resources from a single country. If the resource can 
be acquired in multiple locations, unilateral actions cannot be effective in this regard 
without gaining support from the other producers of the commodity. A second 
complication for resource-denial is that certain products are dual-use in nature. Dual-use 
items can be a needed commodity for everyday life while also having a military or 
weapons application. Imposing sanctions on dual-use items can increase the difficulty in 
acquiring these military capabilities while simultaneously raising prices for every day 
essential items. Dual-use items can have secondary and third order effects where 
humanitarian goods prices are increased including food stuffs and clothing.    
 The fourth reason listed by Crawford and Klotz for gaining compliance through 
sanctions is political fracture.123 Political fracture recognizes the power of the 
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government, but also recognizes the inherent strength within society. Sanctions under this 
method seek to weaken the regime by removing its legitimacy. These sanctions seek to 
encourage social movements capable of demanding change and weakening the support 
base of the ruling government. Failure to conform will destabilize the government and 
potentially lead to regime change. 
Each of these strategies for implementing sanctions carries a price which must be 
paid to carry out the desired changes in behavior by all parties involved. As the burden of 
paying the prices of the sanctions becomes greater than maintaining the policy objective, 
the likelihood of sanctions working improves. However, the cost of imposing sanctions 
must also be looked at from the perspective of the sanctioner. These costs come in the 
form of reduced economic activity with the targeted state, reduced diplomatic 
international relations, and inadvertently lead to second and third order effects where 
retaliation sanctions are imposed. 
 Other costs can be incurred in the political sphere. Rising cost of goods resulting 
from political actions must ultimately be paid for by the public. Rising cost of goods 
decreases domestic consumption and creates drag on the economy. Additionally, 
businesses are affected through rising costs of goods needed for imports, and reduced 
competitiveness. Limited access to critical resources such as aluminum, steel, or energy 
further impacts net output and stunts economic growth. Continued duration of these costs 
can weaken a political party support base overtime. Failure to gain public support for a 
given policy action or imposed sanction can lead to demands for change prior to 
achieving the desired outcome. 
As a result, governments which rely on strong public support are more vulnerable 
to the effects of sanctions than a more authoritarian style of government. Democratic 
governments which rely on public elections remain under constant pressure to implement 
policies which are in the best interests of their own public. The voice of the public can 
influence and drive policy action. Democratically elected governments become more 
prone to compellence and to normative arguments which seek to prevent actions or 
policies in violation of international norms. Similarly, resource denial can be most 
effective when depriving goods and materials which the public is reliant upon for 
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domestic consumption. Rising prices due to shortages of consumer products will not be 
tolerated without first gaining massive public support.   
In contrast, authoritarian governments become a “hard target” to sanctions due to 
their ability to push the costs onto the public without risking their political power 
base.124  Authoritarian governments can absorb the political and economic pressures by 
pushing the costs upon the public with little reprisal or consequence to their political 
power base. Instead, narrowly focused sanctions which target the political leadership and 
their supporters are likely to impact change where the sanctions limit the capability of 
authoritarian regimes from performing rent-seeking activities or target luxury item 
goods.125  
B. WHEN ARE SANCTIONS MOST EFFECTIVE? 
Several debates exist whether sanctions work and whether they should continue to 
be employed. While nobody is advocating for direct military use for each international 
rule violation, arguments continue to arise over how to effectively implement change for 
states which fail to comply to international norms. In this way, economic sanctions have 
become the liberal alternative to war.126  Direct military action is reserved for larger and 
more ambitious policy objectives such as forcing regime change, seizing foreign territory, 
or altering foreign military behavior.127  Economic sanctions offer an alternative method 
for applying force to change behavior. When examining foreign policy options, economic 
sanctions present a cleaner and cheaper alternative to military intervention.128   
Comprehensive studies examining economic sanctions have concluded that most 
of the time sanctions fall short of their objectives. One key study which evaluated the 
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effectiveness of sanctions was conducted by Gary Hufbauer, Jeffrey Schott, and 
Kimberly Ann Elliot. This study was initially conducted in 1985 and updated in 1990 
during which they examined global sanctions implemented between 1914 and 1990. The 
results of the study identified 115 separate instances of sanctions being applied.129  Of 
the 115 cases, only 40 (34 percent) were evaluated as successful in meeting their 
objectives.130  In reexamining this same study, Robert Pape made the assertion that of 
the 40 successful cases of economic sanctions, only five can be considered actual 
successes solely resulting from sanctions.131  The remaining 35 cases were rejected by 
Pape on grounds that other factors were the cause for change in policy objective 
including direct and indirect military action.132   
Likewise, other examinations of the effect of sanctions have found evidence that 
the sanctions may actually undermine achieving the desired outcome. A study by the 
National Bureau of Asian Research concluded that economic sanctions imposed on 
Burma undermined social reform from happening.133  Rather than causing political 
change, sanctions are believed to have inhibited any opposition movements from forming 
to bring about change in Burma. By weakening social reform groups, the political rulers 
of Burma were able to strengthen their hold onto power and become entrenched in their 
policy decisions. 
Critics further site the unethical nature of imposing sanctions. Sanctions are often 
implemented as a means to an end. As such, sanctions are designed to inflict as much 
pain as possible to maximize pressure on the target government.134  In pressuring the 
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government, “the citizens of the sanctioned country are used as a means to achieve the 
foreign policy objectives.”135  Secondary effects of sanctions can result in reduced 
education, healthcare, and lower economic output of the state.136  The increased burden 
upon the citizens raises the ethical nature of sanctions into question. 
The end state sought through implementing sanctions is often used to justify 
imposing additional hardships on the citizens. Consequentialism theory uses the outcome 
of actions to determine what is wrong and what is right. By doing so, any short-term 
consequences that result from sanctions being implemented can be justified by achieving 
a change in policy which outweighs the increased burden of the citizens. As a result, the 
ethical component of sanctions continues to be debated.   
 As economic sanctions continue to be employed, evidence and research has begun 
to emerge in factors which contribute to an increased chance of success. Miljkovic 
concluded that economic sanctions are most likely to succeed when the following 
conditions are met: “(1) modest policy change is sought, (2) sanctions are comprehensive, 
i.e., both trade and financial sanctions are imposed, (3) the target does not receive 
significant support from a third party, the sender has much greater economy than the 
target, (5) there is international co-operation in the imposition of sanctions, and (6) the 
target is economically and politically weak.”137  However, achieving these conditions 
can be difficult. Determining what constitutes a modest policy will differ from country to 
country. Additionally, completely isolating a country from third-party support can be 
near impossible to achieve. North Korea is a good example of a country who has thrived 
with the aid of third-party support from China while facing comprehensive economic 
sanctions.  
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 Dean Lacy and Emerson Niou contend that evaluating economic sanctions as 
either a success or failure “miss the real impact of sanctions as a policy tool.”138  Lacy 
and Niou argue instead that sanctions operate in an environment where neither side has a 
full understanding of the outcome. In this model, sanctions function like punishments. 
While sanctions do not always correct behavior, the threat of additional punishment can 
alter future decision-making processes. Often, the threat alone of imposing sanctions can 
act as a deterrent to cause change or prevent further actions which would bring additional 
punishment.   
Under this game theory application of sanctions, if the behavioral actions were 
known to both sides prior to implementing sanctions then economic sanctions should 
never be implemented at all.139  If complete information were available to both sides, 
then sanctions would only be threatened if they would be guaranteed to succeed. If 
sanctions were destined to fail at achieving behavioral change then threatening sanctions 
would only incur costs on both sides without achieving any gains. Lacy and Niou 
conclude that threat of imposing sanctions by itself is a foreign policy choice which can 
bring about positive change.140  If the act of threatening sanctions fails to bring about 
change then it is less likely that the imposition of sanctions will have the desired 
outcome. Imposing sanctions after the threat has failed is still important as it can affect 
decision makers consideration of future threats of sanctions.   
If an action is threatened but never carried out it will signal that the sanctioner is 
bluffing. By doing so, future threats of sanctions lose their ability to create change as they 
are more likely to be considered bluffs. Additionally, implementing sanctions can still 
create incentives for change fearing that more damaging sanctions will be implemented 
when no change in policy is observed. 
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The success rate of economic sanctions is low in bringing about policy change. As 
previously discussed, economic sanctions alone have only been successful in directly 
achieving stated policy objectives between five percent and 35 percent of the time 
without other means of intervention. However, there is some evidence supporting the 
continued use of economic sanctions as a foreign policy tool. Elizabeth Rogers shows her 
optimism for sanctions by stating that “economic sanctions are more effective than most 
analysts suggest. Their efficacy is underrated in part because unlike foreign policy 
instruments sanctions have no natural advocate or constituency.”141  The influence that 
sanctions have on behavioral change cannot be observed directly. Determining the 
success or failure of a sanction is only observable in hindsight, while the intermediate 
effects are left unknown.  
 Implementation of economic sanctions changes the status-quo and casts a vote in 
future policy making decisions. Imposing economic sanctions makes pursuit of the policy 
objective more difficult. By limiting resources and directly increasing the cost of policies 
that violate international norms, future decisions are altered. Difficulty in obtaining 
resources and material will alter the calculus of decision-making in weighing the cost-
benefit analysis of future decisions that are also in violation of international law by the 
sanctioned state as well as observing nations not impacted by the original sanction. While 
direct measures of sanctions cannot be directly measured, their psychological effects 
cannot be discounted entirely either. 
C. SANCTIONS AGAINST NORTH KOREA AND IRAN 
The DPRK along with Iran are two of the most heavily sanctioned countries in the 
world. In both cases, the objectives of the sanctions have been clearly defined and go 
beyond looking to cause regime change or even collapse. Sanctions have been imposed 
against Iran and North Korea with the clear intent of preventing the proliferation of 
nuclear weapons. Both states have been branded as “rogue states” by the United States 
administration and yet the outcomes of sanctions have witnessed noticeably different 
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outcomes. In 2013, Iran agreed to abide by the Joint Plan of Action (JPA), which 
provided sanction relief equal to seven billion USD in return for agreeing to stop 
development of its nuclear program.142  This agreement was followed up in 2015 by the 
Iranian government agreeing to the terms of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action 
(JCPA). The JCPA provided terms and conditions for Iran to receive additional 
concessions by preventing it from acquiring non-peaceful nuclear capability.143  The 
JCPA provided relief measures of financial and oil-related restrictions placed on Iran 
totaling $100 billion USD.144  By contrast, North Korea has pursued a different 
trajectory seeking to acquire nuclear weapons and ballistic missile technology despite 
increasing sanctions being leveraged against the North Korean Regime. Sanctions and 
inducements have had very little impact upon changing North Korea’s pursuit of nuclear 
and missile technologies. The explanation for different trajectories in part can be 
explained by the inherent differences in the two countries history and status of nuclear 
programs.145    
1. Iranian Sanctions 
Economic sanctions were initially introduced against Iran following the 1979 
Iranian hostage crisis when 52 U.S. hostages were taken and held captive for 14 months. 
The hostage crisis prompted U.S. President Jimmy Carter to respond by authorizing an 
executive order to seize Iranian property located within the United States. This action 
“deprived Iran of more than $12 billion USD in bank deposits, gold, and property.”146 
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This executive order was followed by additional executive orders prohibiting U.S. 
citizens from travelling to Iran, as well as imposing an embargo on exports and imports to 
and from Iran. These actions caused Iranian oil exports to dry up (down from 2.8 million 
barrels per day in July 2011 to under 1 million barrels per day in July 2012) and depleted 
Iranian financial reserves.147 
The exact reasons for Iran’s decision to release the hostages in January of 1981 
and to agree to the Declarations of Algiers remains unclear. However, U.S. actions, both 
direct and indirect, seem to have played an influential role in bringing about a peaceful 
resolution to the hostage crisis. Economic sanctions forced Iran into waging a battle of 
attrition during the Iran-Iraq war, which began in September 1980. Denial of resources 
made this war increasingly more expensive and difficult to maintain. Despite Iran 
narrowly avoiding additional sanctions being placed on them through the UN Security 
Council, as a result of a veto by the Soviet Union, U.S. influence managed to persuade 
other friendly allies to reduce trade with Iran. This resulted in Iranian oil exports being 
significantly reduced and limiting Iran’s capacity to finance the Iran-Iraq war. It also left 
them unable to pay for needed imports.   Closure of the U.S. embassy, as well as 
positioning of a carrier strike group in the Indian Ocean all worked to send a message that 
Iran was vulnerable and faced international isolation. Economic sanctions, in this case, 
helped to set the stage for peaceful resolution through diplomatic measures. 
 Three years following the Iranian hostage crisis, Iran again became subject to new 
sanctions for their part in in the 1983 bombing of U.S. marines in Lebanon. Iran was 
designated as a state sponsor of terrorism by President Ronald Reagan for sponsoring the 
terrorist group Hezbollah, which was responsible for the bomb that killed 241 U.S. 
marines in Beirut.148  Being designated as a state-sponsor of terrorism immediately 
triggered restricted access to loans and imports of “dual-purposed” arms exports. In 1987, 
these sanctions were expanded under Executive Order 12613 issued by President Reagan 
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which imposed increased import restrictions from Iran. Executive Order 12613 was 
designed as a punishment for the Iranian state’s involvement in sponsoring terrorist 
organizations and hostile actions towards non-threatening vessels.149   
The 1990s demonstrated an increased U.S. reliance on sanctions as a foreign 
policy tool. The 1990s and 2000s against Iran can be viewed as an attempt to limit the 
scope and prevention of the Iranian nuclear program from being developed for non-
peaceful purposes. Sanctions against Iran were expanded in 1992 to target technological 
improvement contributing to the advancement of selected Iranian programs.150  In 1995, 
following the Iranian government’s allowance of foreign direct investment into its oil and 
gas sectors, President Clinton limited U.S. companies’ ability to invest into Iranian oil 
and gas industries.151  In 1996, the Iran-Libya Sanctions Act (ILSA) expanded previous 
sanctions on Iran to limit investment to no more than $20 million USD in Iran’s energy 
sector.152  This arbitrary cap on investment was loosened in 1999 when companies were 
permitted to invest greater than $20 million USD into Iran’s energy sector. The loosening 
of sanctions also allowed for the export of certain food and medical equipment. Between 
2004 through 2010, the UN joined the United States by passing seven resolutions 
targeting the Iranian government to prevent the proliferation of nuclear materials. The 
economic difficulties resulting from sanctions helped stage Iran’s eventual acceptance of 
the JPA in 2013 and JCPA in 2015. In return for halting Iran’s nuclear development 
programs, Iran agreed to abide by the conditions of the JPA and JCPA to receive 
economic relief. 
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2. North Korean Sanctions 
North Korea, like Iran, has been subject to continuous sanctions that have become 
progressively more comprehensive as a result of their nuclear ambitions. North Korea’s 
invasion of the South at the onset of the Korean War enacted a total export embargo on 
North Korea.153  This was followed by the Trade Agreement Extension Act of 1951. 
This act prevented North Korea from being eligible to receive the most favorable tariff 
terms on all U.S. imports from North Korea.154  North Korea was subsequently branded 
as a terrorist state in 1987 for sponsoring the bombing of passenger flight KAL 858 from 
Baghdad, Iraq destined to Seoul, South Korea.155  Since this incident, North Korea 
remained listed as a state-sponsor of terrorism until 2008. However, North Korea was 
relabeled a state-sponsor of terrorism in 2017.156  
U.S. Economic sanctions against North Korea have coincided with the 
development of North Korea’s nuclear weapons. North Korea first ratified the Treaty on 
the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) on 12 December 1985.157  On April 
10, 1992, the safeguards of the NPT became binding for North Korea. In May 1992, 
North Korea submitted its initial report to the International Atomic Energy Agency 
(IAEA) under the NPT agreement. Inconsistencies between North Korea’s initial report 
and findings from IAEA inspections led IAEA inspectors to believe that that North Korea 
was harboring undeclared plutonium. Later attempts by the IAEA requesting additional 
information and access to sites suspected of storage of nuclear waste were denied by 
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North Korea.158  These events would escalate and eventually lead to North Korea 
announcing their intent to withdraw from the NPT on March 12, 1993.   
North Korea would later suspend their withdrawal from the NPT in June 1993 
after United Nation Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 825 passed urging North 
Korea to reconsider its decision to withdraw from the NPT and allow access to IAEA 
inspectors.159  In November 1994, North Korea approached the United States seeking to 
negotiate a solution to the issues that divided them. These talks lead to the signing of the 
Agreed Framework being signed on October 21, 1994. The Agreed Framework placed a 
freeze on the North Korean nuclear program, leading to denuclearization of the Korean 
Peninsula, and provided provisions that would lead to a normalization of relations 
between the United States and the DPRK.160 
The Agreed Framework would only last until North Korea’s effective withdrawal 
from the NPT on April 10, 2003. This decision to leave the NPT coincided with being 
placed on President George W. Bush’s “Axis of Evil” list alongside Iran and Iraq in 
2002. This designation came after the IAEA suspected North Korea was not in 
compliance with its agreement of denuclearization. In an attempt to reopen negotiations 
with North Korea, the Six Party Talks commenced in 2003.   
The Six Party Talks, comprised of members from South Korea, North Korea, 
Japan, United States of America, China, and Russia, consisted of six rounds held over a 
period from 2003 to 2007. Despite best efforts to convince North Korea to abandon their 
nuclear program, the Six Party Talks failed to achieve any substantial results until the 
fifth round of talks. The fifth round of talks gained public affirmation that North Korea 
was willing to shut down its nuclear facilities. In return for this action, North Korea 
requested “security guarantees, economic and energy assistance, and a willingness to 
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proceed with a peace treaty on the Korean Peninsula.”161  However, the Six Party Talks 
would eventually fail when North Korea declared on April 13, 2009, that it would pull 
out of the NPT following condemnation from the United Nations Security Council 
following a failed satellite launch. This UN condemnation of the North Korean satellite 
was declared a direct violation of UNSCR 1718. Along with pulling out of the talks, 
North Korea expelled all nuclear inspectors from the country. 
To date, North Korea has conducted six nuclear weapons tests. The first test 
occurred on October 9, 2006 signifying that it had joined the small list of states 
possessing nuclear weapons. North Korea’s possession of nuclear weapons directly 
violates the NPT. Following North Korea’s claim that it had detonated a nuclear weapon, 
an emergency UNSC meeting was held in which UNSCR 1718 was unanimously passed. 
UNSCR 1718 established economic sanctions prohibiting the import of luxury goods, 
heavy arms, and service and technology exports to North Korea.162  This set of sanctions 
targeted the ruling party by attempting to weaken the regime through prohibiting luxury 
goods flowing into the country while also limiting North Korea’s capability to pursue 
advanced nuclear and weapons technologies. 
The second nuclear test conducted May 25, 2009, occurred in roughly the same 
location as the first, nearly three years after the first nuclear test. This nuclear test was 
significantly larger than the first, prompting concerns that North Korea continued to 
pursue nuclear technology despite sanctions. The second test was followed by placing 
additional economic sanctions on North Korea in the form of UNSC resolution 1874. 
UNSCR 1874 implemented additional financial restrictions, strengthened prohibitions on 
arms trade with North Korea, and increased oversight to ensure compliance with the 
resolution.163  Realizing that the initial sanctions had failed to achieve their aims, 
UNSCR 1874 introduced a more comprehensive set of sanctions designed to strangle the 
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North Korean leaderships ability to economically continue pursuing their development. 
Additionally, this increased set of sanctions signaled politically that the UN would 
continue to impose additional measures if North Korea continued to violate the NPT. 
The DPRK conducted their third test on February 12, 2013, again near the same 
location where the first two nuclear tests had occurred. This nuclear test was estimated at 
approximately six kilotons demonstrating North Korea’s capability of increasing the 
payload with each subsequent nuclear test. Also, this test was significant in the fact that it 
was the first nuclear test under Kim Jung Un. Following the test explosion, an immediate 
UNSC was called and UNSCR 2094 was passed in response to the nuclear test. UNSCR 
2094 further expanded previous sanctions against the DPRK by imposing stricter 
regulations on international banking transactions and diplomatic personnel. 
The fourth and fifth nuclear tests were both conducted in 2016. This was the first 
time that the DPRK had attempted to test multiple nuclear weapons in such a short time 
frame. The fourth test was carried out on January 6, 2016. During this test, the North 
Korean’s claimed to have successfully tested a hydrogen bomb. The claim is viewed as 
doubtful by experts due to the smaller than expected seismic activity associated with the 
blast. However, the claim of successfully testing a hydrogen bomb significantly increased 
the worry of North Korea’s advancing nuclear technologies. Hydrogen bombs are 
significantly more powerful than the atomic bombs which have been previously tested by 
North Korean’s. While most experts doubted the validity of North Korea’s claim of 
detonating a hydrogen bomb, it escalated the international crisis which was developing 
on the Korean Peninsula.    
The fifth nuclear test occurring on September 9, 2016, prompted further concerns 
for the claim that North Korea possessed the capability of mounting nuclear devices onto 
a rocket. This nuclear detonation came following a North Korean missile launch on 
February 7, 2016, which occurred despite warnings from Japan concerning the launch of 
the missile. North Korean’s claim that this missile carried an Earth observation satellite 
but drew scrutiny from the fact that UN sanctions prohibited North Korea from launching 
weapons to test ballistic missile technologies. Following the launch of the satellite, 
UNSCR 2270 was passed on March 2, 2016, which condemned further nuclear tests and 
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long-range missile development.164  UNSCR 2270 further expanded sanctions previously 
enacted on the DPRK. As part of UNSCR 2270, all weapons imports and exports 
involving North Korea became banned. Further restrictions were enacted prohibiting the 
importation of luxury goods, aviation fuels, designated minerals, as well as all requiring 
UN member states to inspect all cargo transiting to or from North Korea.165 
The sixth nuclear test occurred on September 3, 2017. This test was the biggest on 
record being estimated between 50 and 280 kilotons and believed to be the cause of 
triggering a 6.3 magnitude earthquake and subsequent smaller earthquake.166  The 
smaller earthquake is thought to have been triggered as a result of the test site collapsing 
from the detonation. North Korea also claimed the blast to be caused from a hydrogen 
bomb. Response to this latest nuclear test was met again by an emergency meeting of the 
UNSC on September 4, 2017 where the test was strongly criticized. In response, the 
United States Secretary of Defense, James Mattis, warned of a “massive military 
response” to any future perceived threatening behavior from the DPRK.167  North 
Korea’s actions and persistent pursuit of nuclear weapons and ballistic missile 
technologies has led to one of the most comprehensive sanction packages being carried 
out in history with little evidence of being deterred from achieving their goals. 
D. SANCTIONS IMPACT UPON NORTH KOREA 
Sanctions placed on North Korea resulting from the pursuit and testing of nuclear 
weapons have two political objectives.168  The first objective of implementing sanctions 
                                                 
164 United Nations Security Council, 2 March 2016, Resolution 2270 (2016) http://undocs.org/S/RES/
2270(2016). 
165 United Nations Security Council, 2 March 2016, Resolution 2270 (2016) http://undocs.org/S/RES/
2270(2016). 
166 Fox News, “North Korea Claims Hydrogen Bomb Test was ‘Perfect Success,’ 6th Nuclear Test,” 
September 19, 2017, https://www.foxnews.com/world/north-korea-claims-hydrogen-bomb-test-was-
perfect-success-6th-nuclear-test. 
167 Angela Dewan, Taehoon Lee, and Eli Watkins, “Mattis Warns of ‘Massive Military Response’ to 
NK Nuclear Threat,” CNN, September 3, 2017, https://www.cnn.com/2017/09/03/politics/trump-north-
korea-nuclear/index.html. 
168 Haggard and Noland, Hard Target: Sanctions, Inducements, and the Case of North Korea, 228. 
50 
upon North Korea is defensive in nature. Defensive sanctions are a tool designed to 
disrupt the military organization and deter, limit, or prevent the acquisition of materials 
that are perceived as threatening or dangerous to the international community.169  To this 
end, sanctions have been implemented to damage the associated trade and financial goods 
needed to support their development. Import bans have expanded to include most military 
arms and items labeled as dual-use, which have both military and civilian uses. Included 
in the sanctions are freezes in financial assets and businesses which are fundamental to 
financing and acquiring materials as well as certain luxury goods.   
The second objective of sanctions is strategic interactions to bring about 
change.170  Economic sanctions achieve this by raising the price of goods of targeted 
objects. Through raising the costs of goods, the strategic aim of sanctions has been to 
persuade North Korea to negotiate terms for achieving denuclearization. Prohibiting the 
importation of dual-use goods can bring secondary order effects which impact trade and 
increase the costs of goods including some humanitarian items such as food and textiles. 
Simply by raising the price of goods, strategic sanctions impact the target country. As 
Trenin stated, “Whether or not they achieve their objectives, sanctions have great 
economic impact on target countries: their technological development slows down, and 
their populations grow poorer.”171  The net effect of sanctions has hampered North 
Korea’s nuclear program from developing at a quicker rate. 
Despite, the increasingly comprehensive nature of sanctions placed on North 
Korea, sanctions have been unsuccessful at deterring North Korea from pursuing its 
ambitions to acquire nuclear weapons technologies. Figure 1 shows that despite several 
multilateral sanctions through UN Security Council Resolutions, North Korea’s net 
exports and imports continued to increase until 2015. The vertical lines in Figure 1 
denote the implementation of different security council resolutions imposed upon North 
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Korean trade date. Figure 1 is important in showing the decline of North Korea’s trade 
during the famine years and its recovery during the 2000s and 2010s.   
 
Figure 1. North Korea’s Observed Commercial Merchandise 
Trade. Source: Haggard and Noland (2017, p. 75). 
This evidence of sanctions ineffectiveness is further supported in Figure 2, which 
documents China’s net exports of luxury goods into North Korea. Figure 2 is significant 
in showing evidence that sanctions have not had any significant detrimental impact upon 
North Korea’s ability to import luxury items. Further, Chinese luxury good exports have 
increased in a nearly linear fashion as additional UNSCRs were implemented. The 
decline in trade with the European Union was replaced by increased imports of Chinese 
goods.172  
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Figure 2. Chinese Goods Luxury Exports to North Korea, 
2000–2014. Source: Haggard and Noland (2017, p. 77). 
North Korea’s ability to subvert the effects of economic sanctions supports 
Miljkovic’s conclusion that economic sanctions work best when there is no access to 
third-party support such as China.173  Difficulty in enforcing economic sanctions along 
with undefined lists which constituted “luxury goods” and “dual-use” items diminished 
the effectiveness of the sanction regime. Luxury goods remained undefined until UNSCR 
2094 was passed in 2013 following the third nuclear test creating ambiguity in the 
sanctions placed upon North Korea.174  Additionally, North Korea’s commercial trade 
was not penalized until UNSCR 2270 was passed in 2016.175  UNSCR 2270 was 
important in limiting North Korea’s commercial activities which included placing a 
conditional ban on China’s imports of North Korean coal and prohibited China’s exports 
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of aviation fuel to North Korea. The design of the sanction regime allows for third-party 
states, such as China, to play a spoiler-role and prevent the worst effects from the 
sanctions to take hold. The difficulty in enforcing sanctions and trouble generating 
universal support for enforcement of sanctions leads to an ability to bypass the worst 
effects of any sanction regime.176 
Another conclusion Miljkovic provides states that sanctions will be most effective 
when seeking to bring about modest policy goal changes.177  The development of North 
Korea’s nuclear weapons and missile technologies does not constitute a modest policy 
goal. This is evidenced by North Korea rolling out the Byungjin line in 2013, which 
emphasized the development of nuclear weapons in parallel with economic development. 
By placing nuclear development to the same degree of importance as economic 
development, sanctions had little chance of preventing North Korea from pursuing their 
policy objectives. The Byungjin line also suggests that any economic reforms that take 
place within North Korea will have the potential to increase external tensions.178  
Increases in North Korea’s economic development would allow for even greater capacity 
to further develop its nuclear program. 
Case studies focused on Iran and North Korea emphasize the degree in difficulty 
of relying solely upon sanctions for achieving political results when dealing with an 
authoritarian regime capable of absorbing the costs of sanctions. While Iran relied on oil 
exports to fuel its economy, North Korea shares no similar dependency to any single 
foreign import.179  North Korea is the paradigmatic “hard target.”  Days before North 
Korea’s first nuclear test occurred in 2006, United States Secretary of Defense Donald 
Rumsfeld admitted in a memo to the President that, “it appears that it is not only difficult, 
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but possibly impossible, for the U.S. to gain the international diplomatic support 
sufficient to impose the leverage on Iran and/or North Korea required to cause them to 
discontinue their nuclear programs.”180 
When sanctions fail, engagement and inducements offer alternative policy options 
to achieve results.181  Inducements work quid pro quo. In North Korea’s case, 
inducements have been attempted as payment for negotiations in regards with its nuclear 
program. Inducements initially showed signs of success by convincing North Korea to 
return to the Six Party Talks in return for oil and normalization of international relations. 
Again, inducements were able to convince North Korea to reconsider its withdrawal from 
the NPT and to readmit IAEA inspectors after it had declared its initial intent to abandon 
the treaty. However, in both instances, North Korea quickly showed its intent by 
returning to pursuit of nuclear development. Inducements, like sanctions, have been 
ineffective in negotiating with North Korea. 
Diplomatic engagement attempts by the United States have fallen short of 
achieving any major breakthroughs in altering North Korean policy. Sanctions, 
inducement, and engagement all rely upon coordination as well as domestic internal 
politics of hard targets.182  Without a thorough understanding of the domestic internal 
politics of the hard target, sanctions and engagement are likely to continue in wishful 
thinking.183  Rather than pursuing security through negotiations, the North Korean 
regime has opted for the opposite. The DPRK clings to security through nuclear pursuit, a 
desperate economic system, and foreign dependence upon China.    
Despite diplomatic warnings not to test nuclear weapons, North Korea has 
conducted several tests. In doing so, North Korea appears to have calculated correctly 
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that global responses would be modest in response to its actions.184  North Korea’s two 
principal partners, South Korea and China, appear to have tacitly accepted that North 
Korea is in fact a nuclear power. Public and private trade data lend support to this 
argument. In doing so, a dangerous condition is set, where other aspiring nuclear states 
will seek to imitate North Korea’s ascent to becoming a nuclear state.185 
North Korea’s Byungjin line has left North Korea with few options. 
Denuclearization would qualify North Korea to receive inducements sorely needed to 
boost its ailing economy. Denuclearization would also leave North Korea vulnerable to 
international policy. Continuing pursuit of its nuclear weapons will likely further incur 
additional sanctions and weaken its economy further. For a peaceful reunification to 
occur, North Korea’s security will need to be assured while finding a solution to 
denuclearize the Korean Peninsula.   
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IV. ECONOMICS ANALYSIS FOR REUNIFICATION 
Many of the decisions that North Korea makes remain shrouded in mystery. Gaps 
in knowledge exist from a combination of lack of published data, inconsistencies in the 
published data, and an information vacuum surrounding the internal workings of North 
Korea. What little is known about the North Korean economy has recently become 
available through reconstructing and mirroring economic trade data of other countries. By 
doing so, a picture can be formed which helps illustrate the detrimental impact which 
policy decisions have brought upon North Korea’s economy. These economic policies 
have led North Korea to teeter at the edge of ruin, while its neighbor to the south excels 
at a global level. Understanding policy decisions and the state of the North Korean 
economy can help build an understanding of the difficulties which will be encountered 
through an attempted reunification of the Peninsula.   
 This chapter begins by briefly examining the GDP division between North and 
South Korea. This information leads into showcasing the similarities which exist between 
a North/South Korean reunification scenario and the German reunification experience. 
This chapter concludes by offering cost scenarios and estimates for Korean reunification.   
A. NORTH/SOUTH ECONOMIC STRATEGIES 
Policy differences between North and South Korea have exacerbated the divide 
between Koreas. What was once a unified country now appear to have little resemblance 
in economies, governance, quality of life, and opportunity. Indications from the 1960s, 
1970s, and even 1980s life expectancy at birth was nearly identical.186  North Korea’s 
peculiar “development path” has taken a parabolic shape since the armistice of the 
Korean War in 1953.187  The extreme focus on developing heavy industry at the cost of 
light industry and agriculture allowed for rapid structural change and progress to occur, 
initially. However, inefficiencies eventually gave way to stagnation and finally to decline. 
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The development gap which exists between North and South Korea exists largely 
due to the economic failing of the North Korean economy. This divide has widened over 
the past decades, and all indications point to this development gap continuing to increase 
into the future without intervention. The divergence in economies was illustrated in 
Figure 3.188  Immediately following the division of the Peninsula, North Korea’s 
economy was slightly higher than South Korea’s owing to its inheritance of heavy 
industry. Parity between the two countries would remain similar until the 1970s at which 
point South Korea’s economy would surpass North Korea without any signs of ever 
falling behind. Figure 3 also illustrates the economic collapse of North Korea in 1990s 
and the economic stagnation which has since set in.189 
 
Figure 3. GDP per Capita: 1950–2010. Source: OilPrice 
(2016). 
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While examining the economic factors which have allowed South Korea to thrive 
are outside the bounds of this thesis, South Korea’s growth emerged through an export-
led industrialization strategy.190  This strategy borrowed heavily from the Japanese 
institutions which were developed during the occupation period. Close relations between 
private and public industries helped to develop an industrial sector capable of competing 
at an international level. This focused development plan proved adaptable to overcome 
the comparative disadvantages which South Korea inherited and grow to become a global 
leader in trade. 
North Korea’s adoption of a planned-socialist economy prevented it from 
following the Japanese growth model. The DPRK’s decision to eliminate private industry 
created an atmosphere where all economic decisions were made from the top. To 
maintain isolation, North Korea turned inward to adopt a self-sufficiency ideology which 
ignores comparative advantage and creates disincentives for promoting innovation and 
efficient work-practices. The fallout of the Soviet Union eliminated much of the support 
with which North Korea had become dependent on for energy, technology transfers, and 
financial aid. As a result, North Korea’s economy began to stagnate, while South Korea’s 
economy continues to flourish.  
B. EAST-WEST GERMAN REUNIFICATION EXPERIENCE 
North and South Korea exhibit many parallels with East and West Germany but 
exists on an order of magnitude greater. The experience of reunification between East and 
West Germany and North and South Korea will likely be very different in execution. 
However, striking similarities exist which can be studied and used to plan for a reunified 
future. Similar aspects of reunification between Germany and Korea which exist include:  
population, education, militarization, employment, and migration. 
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Statistical data for North and South Korea’s populations shows that in 1993 the 
DPRK’s population was 21 million.191  The same year, South Korea’s population was 
about 44 million giving a ratio of 2:1 South Koreans for every North Korean.192  A 
similar ratio comparing West Germany population to East Germany’s population was 
4:1.193  The smaller Korean ratio would likely lead to an increased difficulty in 
unification of the countries. A lower ratio would increase the burden on South Korea to 
provide adequate welfare coverage for the North until acceptable levels of reunification 
could occur. 
  Another significant comparison between the two Korea’s population is that 
while South Korea has a higher population, North Korea has a younger median average 
age.194  Current trends in fertility show that South Korea’s replacement levels are 
negative while North Korea’s are positive. Unification of the country could lead to 
improved fertility levels while decreasing concerns over future population policies.195 
Education between the Korea’s also shares a parallel with the German 
Reunification experience. Under unified Germany, it was estimated that more than 80 
percent of East Germans would need to undergo reeducation vocational training to be 
competitive.196  The degree of isolation between East Germany and West Germany, and 
North Korea and South Korea is magnified to even greater proportions. Secondary 
education attendance in the DPRK was asserted to be at 100 percent by both the DPRK 
Ministry of Education and the DPRK National Commission for UNESCO.197  Even if 
this statistical data is accurate, the ideological training, increased degree of isolation, and 
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lack of technology implies that the reeducation efforts of North Koreans will be 
significant. 
The degree of militarization that exists in North Korea is another factor which 
cannot be overlooked and will have to be carefully planned for any reunification effort to 
be successful in Korea. The combined military arms of North and South Korea will be 
more than three to four times that of East-West Germany.198  Maintaining this large 
military force would be certain to increase tensions with neighboring countries such as 
China, Japan, and Russia. While releasing too many of the military force would be sure to 
increase unemployment and unrest at home. Another point of concern is the stark 
difference in ideological background. 
Employment opportunities is another component which much be studied for any 
potential reunification scenario. The isolation of North Korean’s places them at risk for 
predatory actors to take advantage of them. Isolated from the world economy, fair 
practices and prices would endanger the North Korean’s to fall prey to unfair practices 
and business practices from the South. 
 Another consideration for employment under a reunification scenario would be 
the excess cheap labor which would present itself to entrepreneurs seeking to expand 
business in the North. Employment opportunities would develop as working conditions 
become more efficient and as redundant laborers working in factories are moved from 
industry to the service sector. 
 Migration is a final issue which must considered. Lessons learned from the 
German Reunification scenario show that mass migration and open borders initially upon 
reunification can lead to unexpected problems. While limited trade was allowed between 
East and West Germany prior to reunification, large numbers of workers both skilled and 
unskilled workers migrated to the West creating problems of unemployment. The drain in 
the labor force created new economic problems which worsened the crisis and hastened 
the need for reunification between Germanies. 
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Monetary conversion became another factor which encouraged migration to 
occur. According to a currency conversion agreement, Ostmarks (OM) were to be 
converted to Deutschmarks (DM) at a 1:1 ratio.199  The official currency exchange prior 
to this was 4.4 OM to 1 DM.200  Consequently, superior West German goods became 
cheaper in East Germany leading to rising unemployment rates and decreased industrial 
capacity. Savings accounts were converted at an exchange rate of 1.8 DM to 1 OM.201  
This exchange rate served to eliminate nearly half of all East German savings. Further, 
state subsidies were eliminated on East German goods making them more expensive. The 
net effect of this currency exchange was that real disposable income decreased. 
By comparison, Korea’s borders have been much more isolated. Family members 
have been divided without ability to communicate with each other since the Korean War. 
Controlled information and a repressive political structure will likely leave many North 
Koreans wanting to migrate south. Currency conversions should be initially avoided as a 
lesson learned from the German experience. Instead, a more stable trading price would 
result from allowing the North Korean won to exchange in parallel with the South Korean 
won.202  Uncontrolled migration, like East Germany, will result in deteriorating 
economic conditions in North Korea. To limit emigration, policies should be 
implemented which encourage North Koreans to stay in the North for a designated time 
to allow for a gradual stable transition period.203  
C. ECONOMIC COSTS FOR REUNIFICATION OF THE PENINSULA 
The method of unification will in part determine the overall cost needed to 
achieve complete unification. The East-West German reunification was an example of 
radical unification where West Germany absorbed East Germany through the 
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implementation of institutions and mechanisms in all spheres over a short time span. 
Under radical transition scenarios, political rights are also bestowed. East Germans were 
granted the ability to participate in elections and vote. The other method for unification 
involves a gradual transition where policies and market forces are sequenced giving time 
for stabilization to occur in the economic and political spheres.   
A radical reunification scenario of North Korea would involve North Korea being 
absorbed into South Korea. While many North Korean citizens would arguably support 
this happening, the North Korean high-ranking officials would be forcibly removed from 
their positions. This scenario is unlikely to occur unless brought upon through a forced 
regime change, or through a collapse of the North Korean government. 
Alternatively, a gradual transition scenario would allow for a peaceful transition 
to occur either through the North Korean government implementing policies to bring 
about a market economy, or through a temporary separation where North and South 
Korea agree to a unification scenario later. This method would allow time to establish 
policies such as ones concerning migration which could lead to lower social costs being 
incurred. 
Ultimately, the method of reunification, gradual or radical, will determine the 
costs associated with reunification. Under either method, South Korea will bear the 
burden of the costs. The gradual transition method will be cheaper for South Korea as a 
radical transition would bring about much higher social safety net costs.204  Unification 
of the Korean Peninsula brings with it both costs and benefits. 
The main costs for any unification scenario include: emergency relief, 
infrastructure, education, health care, and integrating institutions.205  These costs are 
included in the sum-total for reunification costs. Wolf and Akramov determine that 
unification will be considered complete when the North Korean income per capita 
doubles. By this definition, Wolf and Akramov determine that unification of the Korean 
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Peninsula will cost between US$50 and US$670 billion dollars over the course of five 
years to achieve.206  While two Korean unification research institutes, (Korea Institute 
for International Economic Policy (KIEP) and Korea Institute for Industrial Economics 
and Trade (KIET)) have estimated that unification could cost as much as US$954 billion 
over 20 years if conducted in a radical unification scenario similar to the German 
unification, or US$3,947 billion for 45 years.207  This amounts to 9.5-12 percent of 
South Korea’s annual GDP based on South Korea’s reported 2015 GDP.208 
While these costs appear to be high, researchers and South Korean policy-makers 
agree that the economic benefits associated with unification outweigh the costs 
involved.209  The wide difference in cost estimates arises from different models which 
are used to predict future growth for both North and South Korea under unification. The 
two methods commonly employed to determine cost of unification utilize both model-
based simulations while the other uses an aggregate cost method.210  Under the model-
based approach, specific parameters are defined, and values are assigned. With the 
parameters defined, costs are then added up to give the total costs for unification to 
achieve the parameters input. Different models used to predict unification include a 
computable general equilibrium (CGE) model, a model based on incremental capital 
output ratio (ICOR) and a macroeconomic model.211  The other method used to predict 
unification scenarios are aggregate cost scenarios.212  Through this alternative method, 
variables that affect growth are evaluated. The changes associated with these variables 
are then aggregated to evaluate the impact of growth based upon unification. Recent 
estimates for unification costs of the Korean Peninsula are detailed in Table 1. 
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Costs from 2016 to 
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2016 
Source: Kim, Unveiling the North Korean Economy, 294. 
 
Not surprisingly, different predictive models reach different conclusions. Table 1 
highlights some commonalities to all predictions based on cost of Korean unification. 
The first common trend is that radical unification will incur higher costs than a more 
gradual unification scenario. Second, is that the longer reunification takes to achieve, the 
higher the cost to achieve it will be. Third, postponing unification to a later date increases 
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the sum-total required for unification to occur. However, deciding based on cost alone 
would fail to recognize the economic benefits which stand to be gained. 
Like unification cost estimates, the benefits of unification can also be modeled 
utilizing a model-based scenario or empirical method. Table 2 summarizes the economic 
benefits to achieving unification of the Korean Peninsula through a variety of methods. In 
all predictions, North Korea stands to gain tremendous economic benefits resulting from 
unification. Likewise, South Korea is predicted to benefit economically under most 
conditions through unification. Of note, the KIEP and KIET gradual unification model 
shows remarkable growth as a result of unification with North Korea’s GDP rising 
anywhere between 8.5 and 14 percent over the next 40 years, while South Korea’s GDP 
stands to increase between 2.1 and 7.3 percent over the same period.213   




Unification Benefits Methodology 
Choi 
(2008) 
Radical North Korea’s annual growth rates: 5 
to 18 percent for 30 years 
South Korea’s annual growth rates:  





Gradual North Korea’s annual growth rates:  
8.5 to 14.5 percent for 40 years 
South Korea’s annual growth rates:  




Gradual North Korea’s annual growth rates:  
6.19 percent or lower for 35 years 
South Korea’s annual growth rates:  
increase by 0.32 percent point or lower 
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Unification Benefits Methodology 
Office 
(2014) South Korea’s value-added:  increase by 1.0 percent point for 45 years 
Sung 
(2014) 
Gradual North Korea’s GDP:  increase by 656 
percent at maximum for 35 years 
South Korea’s GDP:  Decrease by at 
least 2.03 percent for 35 years 
CGE model 
 Source:  Kim, Unveiling the North Korean Economy, 295. 
 
The benefits of unification are expected to have a profound impact upon growth 
under a unified Korea. North Korea stands to benefit through a reduction in personnel 
and national defense expenditures. North Korea would also benefit economically through 
increased improvements in labor productivity and human capital growth, institutional 
reforms, and economic stabilization. Additionally, increased inter-Korean economic 
cooperation and trade reasons to benefit both North and South Korea.   South Korea’s 
growth would be derived from reduced security expenditures and through improved 
efficiency from the use of its resources. 
D. CONCLUSIONS 
Under any scenario, the cost of unification of the Korean Peninsula is high. This 
burden would ultimately fall upon the South Korean tax-payers to bear. However, 
unification would also generate benefits for both South and North Koreans alike. Korea 
can benefit from studying and applying lessons learned from other transition experiences. 
The German reunification experience offers a road map which can help lead and guide 
Korea through its own unification experience. 
A successful reunification of the Korean Peninsula offers great benefits. From a 
social aspect, families would finally be allowed to be reunited after being forcefully 
separated during the events of the Japanese occupation and the events which followed the 
liberation from Japan. Additionally, millions of North Koreans would be offered a chance 
to access information and travel which has been denied to them. 
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Unified Korea would also benefit from gaining access to cheap labor and an 
abundant source of natural resources. Increased economic growth opportunities would 
become available through increased North-South trade opportunities, opening the North 
up to foreign investment, and increased quality of life in the North.  
Politically, North Koreans would gain the ability to participate and exercise their 
vote in political matters. The famine in North Korea in the mid-1990s could have been 
avoided. While physical effects such as flooding played a part, famines consist of 
complex social, political, and economical circumstances. The breakdown of the Soviet 
Union and trade relations with China are as much to blame as the flooding which 
occurred destroying crops and fields. Even if enough food exists within the country, 
failure to distribute the food properly can lead to massive waste and rot occurring while 
laborers go without food. 
Economically, North Korea does not possess a comparative advantage regarding 
agriculture or wheat production. However, they do possess significant amounts of natural 
resources and metals which could be used to acquire food needed to maintain and feed 
the population. Had North Korea opened its doors to international trade, it could have 
used its abundant natural resources to trade for food. Unification with the South would 
benefit North Korea through increased trade and access to capital needed to develop its 




 The geo-political decision to divide Korea into two separate states in 1945 did 
more than simply create a boundary line between North and South Korea. It divided the 
economy between predominantly heavy industry based in the north and concentrated 
light industry and agriculture in the south. The division separated economic trade lines, 
divided families, and created a rift within a culture which had existed since 676 AD. As 
time passes, this rift continues to widen creating increased differences between North and 
South Korea. Despite the challenges, it is not surprising that the desire to reunify the two 
countries remains intact. Although the relationship between North and South Korea has 
become strained over the past 70 years, shared language, culture, and historical 
experiences remain. 
The Korean Armistice established in 1954 has led to the establishment of one of 
the most militarized zones in the world. The unresolved conflict between North and 
South Korea continues to require a U.S. military presence within South Korea. The 
continuous U.S. military presence within the region has aided in stabilizing the region 
from further military conflict between the North and South. However, any continued U.S. 
presence acts to increase tensions within China due to the close proximity of the U.S. 
forces. A reunified Korea would call into question whether the U.S. forces would 
continue to be needed in the region. A unified Korea would dissolve the North Korean 
military threat to the U.S. and its regional allies while also allowing the U.S. to promote 
support for a liberal international order. 
While passing time continues to make the challenges of reunifying the Korean 
Peninsula harder, it also increases the urgency for reunification to be attempted sooner 
rather than later. The famine which took an estimated 600,000 to one million lives could 
have been avoided through trade and political action.214  While torrential rains and 
natural weather conditions contributed to the food shortage, political and economic 
decisions are equally culpable for these deaths. Studies of the North Korean economy 
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show that the government and leadership made policy choices which isolated North 
Korea and inhibited economic growth. North Korea’s national ideology, Juche, and its 
desire to protect the regime have fostered a humanitarian crisis where the public’s lives 
serve only to support the elite, with no consideration for their well-being. North Korea’s 
continued isolation and economic policies have not removed the possibility that future 
famines or humanitarian crises will occur. 
North Korean attempts to implement economic reforms have fallen far short of 
what is required to foster sustained economic growth. Implementation of special 
economic zones (SEZs) along the borders of China and South Korea failed to attract large 
amounts of foreign investments. The closed-nature of the Kim Regime prevented large-
scale investment into the SEZs. Reasons for the unenthusiastic support of SEZs in North 
Korea include: lack of sufficient private ownership, autonomy, market coordination, and 
legal structure.215  Other market reforms attempted by the North Korean regime show a 
reluctance to allow activities, which were already occurring, to exist while still 
maintaining a strong state authority over economic controls. Without further economic 
reforms, North Korea’s economic potential remains a shadow of what it could achieve. 
Economic growth is further threatened within North Korea by the increasingly 
comprehensive sanctions being implemented against North Korea. While economic 
sanctions have shown to be ineffective at stopping North Korea from acquiring nuclear 
weapons and missile technology, they have created other challenges for the North Korean 
economy. Restrictions on North Korea’s ability to import energy sources such as oil and 
gas limit the capacity for North Korea’s economy to function properly. Limitations on 
energy have created significant electrical shortages and reduced opportunity for North 
Korean factories to operate at full capacity. These shortages effect the productivity of the 
North Korean state to grow its economy, while also decreasing products manufactured in 
North Korea for export purposes. Other actions by the sanctions, such as freezing bank 
assets or requiring inspection of cargos with imports or exports from North Korea, limit 
the DPRKs ability to acquire contraband material and further its strategic objectives. 
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North Korea’s survival is largely credited to China, which provides the majority 
of all North Korean trade. The DPRK’s close relationship with China allows North Korea 
to bypass the worst effects of economic sanctions. China continues to provide needed aid 
in the form of food and energy to stave off crisis. This spoiler role provided by China 
enables North Korea to play a far greater role in geopolitics than its size would predict. 
North Korea’s location, situated between South Korea and China, allow it to act as a 
buffer between pro-China and pro-American policies. Dissolution of North Korea would 
place pro-Western policies on China’s borders.   
China has expressed concern that a collapse of the North Korean regime would 
destabilize the region by creating a humanitarian crisis and increasing the likelihood that 
a refugee crisis would develop.216  A refugee crisis would negatively affect both China 
and South Korea, as they share borders with North Korea, and would be the most likely 
to receive the refugees. China’s support for creating conditions where peaceful 
reunification can occur are important for maintaining a smooth reunification. However, 
China is also aware that a unified Korea could also contribute to an increase of pro-
American policy being implemented. A unified Korea could amplify any perceived 
security threats which China views. Reassuring China’s security while emphasizing the 
potential economic benefits to a unified Korea are important for developing the Chinese 
support needed for a gradual reunification to occur. 
 The East-West German reunification experience foreshadows that any attempt to 
reunify the Korean Peninsula will be fraught with difficulties and challenges. While 
South Korea has risen to become an economic leader on the international stage, North 
Korea’s economy has stagnated and remains in peril of collapsing as a result of previous 
economic and security policy decisions. The differences in the North-South Korea 
reunification scenarios mirror the East-West German experience in many aspects offering 
indications of the challenges which can be expected to be encountered if reunification is 
attempted. Similarities in populations, institutions, wealth, education, and employment 
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conditions all share similarities with divided Germany. However, increasing time of 
division exacerbate these factors making the challenges of reunification more difficult to 
achieve.  
 There are several scenarios under which North and South Korea can reunify. The 
preferred method occurs through a peaceful gradual process. Gradual reunification enjoys 
many benefits such as a reduced need to provide immediate social safety nets and an 
overall lower cost to reunify. A gradual transition to a unified country can also create 
other effects such as building incentives, which would eliminate a refugee crisis, provide 
incentives to local landowners, and a phased buildup of infrastructure to foster economic 
growth. 
The alternative to a gradual unification scenario is a radical scenario where 
transition occurs quickly. This can result from regime collapse, armed conflict or war, or 
a forced intervention from international actors. These scenarios are almost always less 
desirable as it entails large costs to prevent social instability. East-West German 
reunification demonstrated many of the problems which are associated with a radical 
transition of government. The need to provide social welfare created large costs and an 
environment which amplified suffering through the transition period. 
Reunification of Korea has international implications. Reunification holds large 
potential for regional economic growth for decades. To achieve this will require 
international cooperation. Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula remains a challenge 
and a threat to international stability. The United States, along with China and South 
Korean cooperation are necessary to create the environment where North Korea can be 
persuaded to denuclearize. Sanctions, inducements, and engagement have all failed so far 
to convince North Korea to cooperate. Diplomatic talks hold the key in convincing North 
Korea to denuclearize. Acquiring China’s cooperation will be necessary to create the 
conditions necessary to convince North Korea to do so. Failing to do so, will continue to 
embolden the North Korean regime and reduce the future likelihood of a peaceful gradual 
reunification occurring. 
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